Voter responses to electoral complexity: Ticket splitting, rational voters and representation in the federal republic of Germany

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 487-505

  Bawn, Kathleen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033461592     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123499000228     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1954).
2. In this article I use the word 'strategic' in a relatively broad way. A voter reacts strategically if she votes in a way that brings about the outcome she regards as best. This would include strategic voting in the narrowest sense, that is, voting for candidate A even though she prefers B in order to avoid the worst outcome C. But strategic reactions also include considering factors other than policy agreement (e.g., effectiveness, impact on coalition) in deciding what candidate to vote for.
3. Gary Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 29-33; and Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1989), pp. 142-55.
4. Gary Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 29-33; and Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1989), pp. 142-55.
5. The empirical question of whether Duverger's psychological effect occurs is addressed by André Blais and R. K. Carty, 'The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 79-93.
6. New Zealand and Albania have adopted close variants of the German system. Japan, Russia and Italy have adopted systems that are not proportional but involve a similar mix of single-member districts and list mandates.
7. Eckhard Jesse, 'The West German Electoral System: The Case for Reform, 1949-87', Western European Politics, 10 (1987), 434-48, and 'Split-voting in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of Federal Elections from 1953 to 1987', Electoral Studies, 7 (1988), 109-24.
8. Eckhard Jesse, 'The West German Electoral System: The Case for Reform, 1949-87', Western European Politics, 10 (1987), 434-48, and 'Split-voting in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of Federal Elections from 1953 to 1987', Electoral Studies, 7 (1988), 109-24.
9. The district candidates are nominated by the district party organizations, the lists are put together at the state level. This article's data is from the pre-reunification period, when the Federal Republic consisted of ten states. Districts are drawn so as to be roughly equivalent in population. The number of districts per state varied from five (Bremen) to seventy-three (Nordrhein-Westfalen); the total nationwide was 248.
10. The exception is when a party wins more district seats than its overall vote share would allow. In this case the party is able to keep all of its district seats. This provision has resulted in a small number of extra seats (Ueberhangmandaten) in several legislative periods. In the period studied in this article, no more than two extra seats were won in this manner.
11. Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976); and Roger Noll and Morris Fiorina, 'Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators', Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1979), 239-54.
12. Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976); and Roger Noll and Morris Fiorina, 'Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators', Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1979), 239-54.
13. Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 139 (1983), 377-104.
14. Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle and Christopher Johnsen, 'The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (1981), 642-64.
15. Thomas Lancaster and W. David Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; and Kathleen Bawn, 'Checks and Balances Without Gridlock?' in Bruce Cain and Roger Noll, eds, Constitutional Reform in California (Berkeley, Calif.: IGS Press 1995), pp. 129-62.
16. Thomas Lancaster and W. David Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; and Kathleen Bawn, 'Checks and Balances Without Gridlock?' in Bruce Cain and Roger Noll, eds, Constitutional Reform in California (Berkeley, Calif.: IGS Press 1995), pp. 129-62.
17. On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
18. On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
19. On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
20. On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
21. On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
22. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
23. Henry Bretton, 'Germany Today', in James K. Pollock, Germany Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 111-39; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German System (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'; and Stephen Porter, 'First-Ballot Voting in Germany: Is There a Personal Vote?' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
24. Henry Bretton, 'Germany Today', in James K. Pollock, Germany Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 111-39; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German System (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'; and Stephen Porter, 'First-Ballot Voting in Germany: Is There a Personal Vote?' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
25. Henry Bretton, 'Germany Today', in James K. Pollock, Germany Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 111-39; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German System (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'; and Stephen Porter, 'First-Ballot Voting in Germany: Is There a Personal Vote?' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
26. Henry Bretton, 'Germany Today', in James K. Pollock, Germany Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 111-39; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German System (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'; and Stephen Porter, 'First-Ballot Voting in Germany: Is There a Personal Vote?' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
27. Cain et al., The Personal Vote; Mathew McCubbins and Frances Rosenbluth, 'Party Provision for Personal Politics: Dividing the Vote in Japan', in Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, eds, Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-55; Gary Cox and Michael Thies, 'The Cost of Intra-party Competition: SNTV and Money Politics in Japan', Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 267-91.
28. Cain et al., The Personal Vote; Mathew McCubbins and Frances Rosenbluth, 'Party Provision for Personal Politics: Dividing the Vote in Japan', in Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, eds, Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-55; Gary Cox and Michael Thies, 'The Cost of Intra-party Competition: SNTV and Money Politics in Japan', Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 267-91.
29. Cain et al., The Personal Vote; Mathew McCubbins and Frances Rosenbluth, 'Party Provision for Personal Politics: Dividing the Vote in Japan', in Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, eds, Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-55; Gary Cox and Michael Thies, 'The Cost of Intra-party Competition: SNTV and Money Politics in Japan', Comparative Political Studies, 31 (1998), 267-91.
30. Throughout this article I use 'major party' to mean CDU/CSU and SPD, and 'minor party' to mean all others.
31. Stephen Fischer, 'The Wasted Vote Hypothesis: West German Evidence', Comparative Politics, 5 (1973), 293-9; David Conradt, 'The Electorate: 1980-83', in Karl Cerny, ed., Germany at the Polls: The Bundestag Elections of the 1980s (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1990), 29-56.
32. Stephen Fischer, 'The Wasted Vote Hypothesis: West German Evidence', Comparative Politics, 5 (1973), 293-9; David Conradt, 'The Electorate: 1980-83', in Karl Cerny, ed., Germany at the Polls: The Bundestag Elections of the 1980s (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1990), 29-56.
33. Cerny, Germany at the Polls, p. 280.
34. Many district candidates have positions on the party lists too, so it is possible to lose a district race and still be elected via the list. This obviously would attenuate but not eliminate the incentive to cultivate a personal vote. It is not clear how a district candidate's vote gap would affect his list position. On the one hand, it does little harm to place a popular candidate who is likely to win his district high on the list. Since he is likely to win the district seat, the candidates below him are unlikely to be affected by their lower ranking. On the other hand, such a candidate has little need for the 'insurance' of a district mandate.
35. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); and Fiorina, Congress.
36. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); and Fiorina, Congress.
37. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, p. 61.
38. Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'.
39. John Zaller explores this argument thoroughly in the context of elections to the US House of Representatives. He argues that incumbency advantage in the US could be entirely due to 'talent' - or what I am calling 'fit', not to casework or other efforts to use incumbency status to facilitate personal contact with constituents (John Zaller, 'Politicians As Prize Fighters: Electoral Selection and Incumbency Advantage', in John Geer, ed., New Perspectives in Party Politics: Essays in Honor of Stanley Kelley, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, forthcoming)).
40. Heino Kaack, 'The FDP in the German Party System', in Cerny, ed., Germany at the Polls, pp. 77-110.
41. Closeness of race has been a critical factor in the extent to which Duverger's strategic effect has mattered in British elections. See Duff Spafford, 'Electoral Systems and Voters' Behavior: Comment and a Further Test', Comparative Politics, 5 (1972), 129-34.
42. Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Second-Vote Campaign Strategy of the West German Free Democratic Party' European Journal of Political Research, 16 (1988), 317-37.
43. David Conradt, The West German Party System (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972); David Conradt, 'The 1976 Campaign and Election', in Cerny, ed., Germany at the Polls, pp. 29-56.
44. David Conradt, The West German Party System (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972); David Conradt, 'The 1976 Campaign and Election', in Cerny, ed., Germany at the Polls, pp. 29-56.
45. Fischer, 'The Wasted Vote Hypothesis'; Cerny, Germany at the Polls, pp. 280-1; Jesse, 'Split Voting in the Federal Republic of Germany'; Conradt, 'The 1976 Campaign and Election'.
46. Fischer, 'The Wasted Vote Hypothesis'; Cerny, Germany at the Polls, pp. 280-1; Jesse, 'Split Voting in the Federal Republic of Germany'; Conradt, 'The 1976 Campaign and Election'.
47. Fischer, 'The Wasted Vote Hypothesis'; Cerny, Germany at the Polls, pp. 280-1; Jesse, 'Split Voting in the Federal Republic of Germany'; Conradt, 'The 1976 Campaign and Election'.
48. Fischer, 'The Wasted Vote Hypothesis'; Cerny, Germany at the Polls, pp. 280-1; Jesse, 'Split Voting in the Federal Republic of Germany'; Conradt, 'The 1976 Campaign and Election'.
49. Cox, Making Votes Count, pp. 82-3.
50. Jesse, 'Split Voting in the Federal Republic of Germany'.
51. FDP voters, in particular, tend to be relatively sophisticated about how the electoral system functions and therefore likely to behave strategically. See Roberts, 'The Second-Vote Campaign Strategy of the West Germany Free Democratic Party'.
52. Arnold Zellner, 'An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and Tests for Aggregate Bias', Journal of the American Statistical Association, 57 (1962), 348-68. See Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preference', for an application of this method to study the effect of the two-vote ballot when it was first introduced in the 1953 election.
53. Arnold Zellner, 'An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and Tests for Aggregate Bias', Journal of the American Statistical Association, 57 (1962), 348-68. See Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preference', for an application of this method to study the effect of the two-vote ballot when it was first introduced in the 1953 election.
54. Jesse, 'Split-voting in the Federal Republic of Germany'.
55. I focus in this section on split tickets in which the second vote is for the FDP because it is generally in regard to these split tickets that the vote-for-a-coalition argument is invoked.
56. The FDP announced its coalition intentions in advance of all the elections studied here except for 1969, and in 1969 gave clear indications of leaning towards the SPD. See Roberts, 'The Second-Vote Campaign Strategy of the West German Free Democratic Party'.
57. George Tsebelis, 'A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 395-404. On the general issue of strategic voting under proportional representation, see Gary Cox and Matthew Shugart, 'Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 12 (1996), 299-324.
58. George Tsebelis, 'A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 395-404. On the general issue of strategic voting under proportional representation, see Gary Cox and Matthew Shugart, 'Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 12 (1996), 299-324.
59. Werner Dähnhardt, 'Hoffnungslos vor der Hürde', Spiegel Spezial: Super-Wahljahr '94, 1 (1994), 112-17, p. 113.
60. Arthur Lupia has shown that even relatively uninformed voters can make use of cues to cast the same votes they would have with more complete information. Citizens need not have encyclopedic knowledge of the political environment to participate in effective democracy. See Arthur Lupia, 'Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 63-76; and Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma (New York: Cambridge University Press 1998).
61. Arthur Lupia has shown that even relatively uninformed voters can make use of cues to cast the same votes they would have with more complete information. Citizens need not have encyclopedic knowledge of the political environment to participate in effective democracy. See Arthur Lupia, 'Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 63-76; and Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma (New York: Cambridge University Press 1998).
62. Roberts, 'The Second-Vote Campaign Strategy of the West German Free Democratic Party'.
63. Table 5 computed from figures in Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. 1949 bis 1980 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), pp. 37-9; Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. 1980 bis 1987 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 58-9; and Cerny, Germany at the Polls, p. 280.
64. Table 5 computed from figures in Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. 1949 bis 1980 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), pp. 37-9; Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. 1980 bis 1987 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 58-9; and Cerny, Germany at the Polls, p. 280.
65. Table 5 computed from figures in Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. 1949 bis 1980 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), pp. 37-9; Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. 1980 bis 1987 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 58-9; and Cerny, Germany at the Polls, p. 280.
66. A split ballot with a first vote for a small party and a second vote for a large one does not necessarily indicate a misunderstanding of the electoral system. One possibility is that these ballots are cast by major-party supporters who find their party's district candidate unacceptable for some reason, and wish to cast a protest vote for the first vote. Another possibility is that these ballots are cast by minor-party supporters who find both themselves and their district candidates on the losing side of an important intra-party struggle. Such a voter might be unwilling to support the party on the second vote but would still want to register their support for their district candidate. Both the Greens and the FDP have experienced significant intra-party conflict that could be expected to give rise to this pattern.