Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 309-329

  Kalandrakis, Tasos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Local uniqueness of equilibrium; Regularity; Sequential bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 23344439921     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0620-y     Document Type: Article

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