The survival of the conformist: Social pressure and renewable resource management

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 299, Issue , 2012, Pages 152-161

  Tavoni, Alessandro ^a   Schlüter, Maja ^b   Levin, Simon ^c  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b LEIBNIZ INSTITUTE OF FRESHWATER ECOLOGY AND INLAND FISHERIES   (Germany)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common pool resource; Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Ostracism; Social norm

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; RENEWABLE RESOURCE; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; ECOSYSTEM; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MOLECULAR DYNAMICS; POPULATION SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROCESS OPTIMIZATION; SOCIAL ADAPTATION; SOCIAL ATTITUDE; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL LEARNING; SOCIAL PROBLEM; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; SURVIVAL RATE;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; ECOSYSTEM; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; SOCIAL CONFORMITY; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; SOCIAL VALUES;

EID: 84857914821     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.003     Document Type: Article

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