Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 37-51

  Tarui, Nori ^a   Mason, Charles F ^b   Polasky, Stephen ^c   Ellis, Greg ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Common property resources; Cooperation; Dynamic games; Renewable resources; Subgame perfection; Unobservable actions; Worst perfect equilibrium

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES; DYNAMIC GAMES; SUBGAME PERFECTION; UNOBSERVABLE ACTIONS; WORST PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM;

RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; GROWTH RATE; PRICE DETERMINATION; RENEWABLE RESOURCE; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 37549016403     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.001     Document Type: Article

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