A simple model of collective action

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 725-747

  Sethi, Rajiv ^a   Somanathan, E ^b  

^a USA   (United States)

^b INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; MODEL;

EID: 33646453543     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/500035     Document Type: Article

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