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Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 725-747

A simple model of collective action

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; MODEL;

EID: 33646453543     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/500035     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (17)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.