Debate: Goods, Games, and Institutions—Part 2: “Goods, Games, and Institutions”: A Reply

International Political Science Review

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 402-410

  Aggarwal, Vinod K ^a   Dupont, Cédric ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Bargaining games; International relations; Public goods provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993775997     PISSN: 01925121     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0192512102023004005     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Admati, A.R. and M. Perry (1991). “Joint Prospects without Commitment.”Review of Economic Studies, 58: 259-276.
2. Aggarwal, V.K. and C. Dupont (1999). “Goods, Games, and Institutions.”International Political Science Review, 20(4): 393-409.
3. Aggarwal, V.K. and C. Dupont (2000). Goods, Games and Cooperation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
4. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991). Game Theory. Cambridge, ma: mit Press.
5. Oye, K.A. (1985). “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy.”World Politics, 38(1): 1-24.
6. Wallner, K. (2002). “The Provision of Public Goods in International Relations: A Comment on ‘Goods, Games, and Institutions’.”International Political Science Review, this issue.