Lindahl equilibrium versus voluntary contribution to a public good: The role of the income Redistribution

FinanzArchiv

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 28-49

  Buchholz, Wolfgang ^a   Cornes, Richard ^b   Peters, Wolfgang ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF REGENSBURG   (Germany)

^b NONE

Author keywords

International environmental agreements; Lindahl equilibria; Nash equilibria; Public goods; Warr neutrality

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249080329     PISSN: 00152218     EISSN: 16140974     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/001522106776666997     Document Type: Article

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