Liquidity and manipulation of executive compensation schemes

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 10, 2009, Pages 3907-3939

  Axelson, Ulf ^a,c   Baliga, Sandeep ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c SIFR   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349467901     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn095     Document Type: Article

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