Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers

Economic Theory

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 113-141

  Alonso Paulí, Eduard ^a   Pérez Castrillo, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD PABLO DE OLAVIDE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Incentives; Matching model; Moral hazard; Sharpe ratio

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855228625     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0537-y     Document Type: Article

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