A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market

Economic Theory

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 221-254

  Demichelis, Stefano ^a   Ritzberger, Klaus ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PAVIA   (Italy)

^b INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES   (Austria)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; General equilibrium; Objective function of the firm; Shareholder voting; Stock markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751585442     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0511-8     Document Type: Article

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