Coarse matching with incomplete information

Economic Theory

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 75-104

  Hoppe, Heidrun C ^a   Moldovanu, Benny ^b   Ozdenoren, Emre ^c  

^a LEIBNIZ UNIVERSITY HANNOVER   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^c LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coarse matching; Incomplete information

Indexed keywords

EID: 79954627945     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0514-5     Document Type: Article

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