A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

Revista Brasileira de Economia

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 497-510

  Sotomayor, Marilda ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Auction mechanism; Competitive equilibrium; Demand set

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247114109     PISSN: 00347140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1590/S0034-71402002000300006     Document Type: Article

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