Special agents can promote cooperation in the population

PLoS ONE

Volumn 6, Issue 12, 2011, Pages

  Wang, Xin ^a   Han, Jing ^a   Han, Huawei ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL CONTROL; SOCIAL INTERACTION; HUMAN; PRISONER; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; PRISONERS;

EID: 83755174256     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0029182     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Axelrod R, (1984) The evolution of cooperation New York Basic Books.
2. Nowak MA, (2006) Evolutionary dynamics Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press.
3. Sigmund K, (2010) The calculus of selfishness Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press.
4. Lombardo MP, (1985) Mutual restraint in tree swallows: a test of the tit-for-tat model of reciprocity. Science 227: 1363-1365.
5. Milinski M, (1987) Tit-for-tat in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation. Nature 325: 433-435.
6. Stephens DW, McLinn CM, Stevens JR, (2002) Discounting and reciprocity in an iterated prisoner's dilemma. Science 298: 2216-2218.
7. Greig D, Travisano M, (2004) The prisoner's dilemma and polymorphism in yeast suc genes. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London (series B) 271 (3): 525-526.
8. Krams I, Krama T, Igaune K, M̈and R, (2008) Experimental evidence of reciprocal altruism in the pied flycatcher. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 62: 599-605.
9. Yao X, Darwen PJ, (1998) An experimental study of n-person iterated prisoner's dilemma games. Informatica 18 (4): 435-450.
10. Nowak M, Sigmund K, (1992) Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature 355: 250-252.
11. Nowak M, Sigmund K, (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lost-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner's dilemma game. Nature 364: 56-58.
12. Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabó G, (2010) Defector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations. Physical Review E 81: 057104.
13. Szolnoki A, Szabó G, Perc M, (2011) Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with poolpunishment. Physical Review E 83: 036101.
14. Sigmund K, Hauert C, Nowak MA, (2001) Reward and punishment. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences USA 98: 10757-10762.
15. Ohtsuki H, Iwasa Y, Nowak MA, (2009) Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment. Nature 457: 79-82.
16. Santos MD, Rankin DJ, Wedekind C, (2011) The evolution of punishment through reputation. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London (series B) 278: 371-377.
17. Boyd R, Gintis H, Bowles S, Richerson PJ, (2003) The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences USA 100: 3531-3535.
18. Bowles S, Gintis H, (2004) The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology 65 (1): 17-28.
19. Fehr E, Gächter S, (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137-140.
20. Fehr E, Rockenbach B, (2003) Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 422: 137-140.
21. Gürerk Ö, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B, (2006) The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 316: 108-111.
22. Rand DG, Armao JJ, Nakamaru M, Ohtsuki H, (2010) Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 265 (4): 624-632.
23. Szolnoki A, Perc M, (2010) Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game. Europhysics Letters 92: 38003.
24. Riolo RL, (1997) The effects and evolution of tag-mediated selection of partners in populations playing the iterated prisoner's dilemma. pp. 378-385 In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Genetic Algorithm.
25. Riolo RL, Cohen MD, Axelrod R, (2001) Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414: 441-443.
26. Vainstern MH, Silva ATC, Arenzon JJ, (2007) Does mobility decrease cooperation? Journal of Theoretical Biology 244: 722-728.
27. Droz M, Szwabinski J, Szabó G, (2009) Motion of influential players can support cooperation in prisoner's dilemma. European Physical Journal B 71: 579-585.
28. Helbing D, Yu W, (2009) The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 106: 3680-3685.
29. Chen Z, Gao JX, Cai YZ, Xu XM, (2011) Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents. Physica A 390 (9): 1615-1622.
30. Axelrod R, Dion D, (1988) The further evolution of cooperation. Science 242: 1385-1390.
31. Nowak M, May R, (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359: 826-829.
32. Nowak MA, Bonhoeffer S, May RM, (1994) Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences USA 91: 4877-4881.
33. Szabó G, Töke C, (1998) Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice. Physical Review E 58: 69-73.
34. Lieberman E, Hauert C, Nowak M, (2005) Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature 433: 312-316.
35. Santos FC, Rodrigues JF, Pacheco JM, (2006) Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London (series B) 273: 51-55.
36. Ohtsuki H, Nowak M, (2007) Direct reciprocity on graphs. Journal of Theoretical Biology 247: 462-470.
37. Szabó G, Fáth G, (2007) Evolutionary games on graphs. Physics Reports 446: 97-216.
38. Lozano S, Arenas A, Sánchez A, (2008) Mesoscopic structure conditions the emergence of cooperation on social networks. PLoS ONE 3 (4): e1892.
39. Woelfing B, Traulsen A, (2009) Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment. Journal of Theoretical Biology 257: 689-695.
40. Hammond RA, Axelrod R, (2006) Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive. Theoretical Population Biology 69: 333-338.
41. Fu F, Hauert C, Nowak MA, Wang L, (2008) Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks. Physical Review E 78: 026117.
42. Szolnoki A, Perc M, Danku Z, (2008) Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. Europhysics Letters 84: 50007.
43. Segbroeck SV, Santos FC, Lenaerts T, Pacheco JM, (2009) Reacting differently to adverse ties promotes cooperation in social networks. Physical Review Letters 102: 058105.
44. Moyano LG, Sánchez A, (2009) Evolving learning rules and emergence of cooperation in spatial prisoners dilemma. Journal of Theoretical Biology 259: 84-95.
45. Szolnoki A, Perc M, (2009) Resolving social dilemma on evolving random networks. Europhysics Letters 86: 30007.
46. Szolnoki A, Perc M, (2009) Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks. New Journal of Physics 11: 093033.
47. Szolnoki A, Perc M, (2009) Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules. European Physical Journal B 67: 337-344.
48. Perc M, Szolnoki A, (2010) Coevolutionary games - a mini review. Biosystems 99: 109-125.
49. Cardillo A, Gómez-Gardeñes J, Vilone D, Sánchez A, (2010) Co-evolution of strategies and update rules in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks. New Journal of Physics 12 (10): 103034.
50. Han J, Guo L, Li M, (2005) Guiding a group of locally interacting autonomous. pp. 184-187 In: Proceedings of the 24th Chinese Control Conference.
51. Han J, Guo L, Li M, (2006) Soft control on collective behavior of a group of autonomous agents by a shill agent. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity 19: 54-62.
52. Wang X, Han J, (2011) Special agents can promote cooperation. pp. 5764-5768 In: Proceedings of the 30th Chinese Control Conference.
53. Fogel DB, (1993) Evolving behaviors in the iterated prisoners dilemma. Evolutionary Computation 1 (1): 77-97.
54. Cressman R, (1996) Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Economic Theory 68 (1): 234-248.
55. Sandholm TW, Crites RH, (1996) Multiagent reinforcement learning in the iterated prisoners dilemma. Biosystems 37 (1): 147-166.
56. Miller JH, (1996) The coevolution of automata in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 29: 87-112.
57. Nowak M, Sigmund K, (1989) Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 137: 21-26.
58. Nowak M, (1990) An evolutionarily stable strategy may be inaccessible. Journal of Theoretical Biology 142: 237-241.
59. Ohtsuki H, (2004) Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 227 (3): 299-314.
60. Brafman RI, Tennenholtz M, (1996) On partially controlled multi-agent systems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 4: 477-507.
61. Axtell RL, Radicals ChakravartyS, revolutionaries and reactionaries in a multi-agent model of class norms.
62. Rubinstein A, (1986) Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 39: 83-96.
63. Binmore K, (1987) Modeling rational players: part i. Economics and Philosophy 3: 179-214.
64. Darwen PJ, Yao X, (2001) Why more choices cause less cooperation in iterated prisoners dilemma. pp. 987-994 In: Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation.
65. Cattaneo G, Dennunzio A, Farina F, (2006) A full cellular automaton to simulate predator-prey systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4173: 446-451.
66. Ogata K, (1997) Modern Control Engineering Upper Saddle River, NJ Prentice Hall.