Are all contractual obligations created equal?

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 5-52

  Feldman, Yuval ^a   Teichman, Doron ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

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EID: 83655182264     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. For a recent reiteration of this insight, see Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349,1349-1361 (2009) (presenting an option-based theory of contracts).
2. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 635 (2010) ("[A]n economic prediction of human behavior says that when a promisor can make one extra dollar by breaching his contract, he will breach the contract.").
3. See generally, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990).
4. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001). (Pubitemid 33648830)
5. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (2009).
6. For recent studies, see George S. Geis, Automating Contract Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450,456-460 (2008).
7. Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. III. L. REV. 1033,1034-1049.
8. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006) (discussing approach to contracts in the auto-manufacturing industry).
9. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUB. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry] (discussing prevalence of extralegal agreements in the diamond industry).
10. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton Industry] (discussing alternative approach to contract enforcement in the cotton industry).
11. Doron Teichman, Old Habits Are Hard To Change: A Case Study of Israeli Real Estate Contracts, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 299 (2010) (discussing dollarization of real estate contracts in Israel).
12. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (providing experimental evidence that contractors prefer default rules); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002) (providing experimental evidence of an "endowment effect" created by default rules).
13. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009) (providing experimental evidence that moral judgments affect people's perceptions of contract breach).
14. Ben Depoorter & Stephan Tontrup, Contract Entitlement (U.C. Hastings Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 8, 2011) (on file with authors);
15. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Economics as Context for Contract Law, 75 U. CM. L. REV. 569, 584-588 (2008) (reviewing the literature on contracts and option theory).
16. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 304-305 (2004) (describing the incentive to breach in light of the legal remedy).
17. For an early exposition of the theory, see Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284-286 (1970) (arguing that breaches that lead to Pareto improvements should not be discouraged). More recently, the theory was defended (though in a somewhat lighter version) in Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 442-50 (2006) (arguing that given contractual incompleteness, breaching and paying full expectation damages is moral).
18. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 466, 478 (1980) (arguing that expectation damages can lead to optimal performance incentives). To be sure, the analysis in the text only refers to efficiency from the perspective of the parties' performance decisions. Incorporating other considerations into the analysis may lead to the conclusion that other measures of damages are optimal.
19. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1,11-19 (1985) (arguing that expectation damages may lead to inefficient reliance).
20. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 433-436 (1983) (noting that the expectation remedy would be optimal from the perspective of the allocation of risk only if the buyer is risk averse and the seller is risk neutral).
21. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1574 (2009) (emphasis omitted). The modern concept of efficient breach builds to a large degree on the view presented by Justice Holmes on the nature of expectation damages.
22. See O.W. Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (noting that "[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means . . . that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else").
23. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 17 (1981 ).
24. see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 260-261 (2010).
25. see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708,719-729 (2007).
26. See generally Philip Kitcher, Biology and Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 163, 163-85 (David Copp ed., 2006) (discussing three projects attempting to connect biological fact to theories of morality).
27. see Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
28. See Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 117, 121-22 (2006) (analyzing role of self-deception in dishonest behavior)
29. Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633,634 (2008) (noting the importance of self-perception). For a demonstration of this effect in a legal context.
30. see Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2008) .
31. See, e.g., Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON. THEORY 67 (2007).
32. Emily C. Haisley & Roberto A. Weber, Self-Serving Interpretations of Ambiguity in Other-Regarding Behavior, 68 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 614, 617-624 (2010) .
33. See generally Wemer Gtith, On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments-A Personal Review, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 329 (1995) (reviewing the literature on dictator and ultimatum games).
34. Maurice E. Schweitzer & Christopher K. Hsee, Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification and Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information, 25 J. RISK & UNCEKIAINTY 185, 189-98 (2002) (providing evidence of strategic use of elastic information by participants in series of four studies).
35. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
36. See Bernd Irlenbusch, Relying on a Man's Word? An Experimental Study on Non-Binding Contracts, 24 INT'LREV. L. & ECON. 2 9 9 , 3 1 8 - 2 0 , 319 tbl. 10, 320 tbl. U ( 2004 ).
37. See, e.g., Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Laws, 42 HAKV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 358-362 (2005) (describing the forces driving the creation of nonlegal sanctions).
38. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 56-59 (1991) (describing the different types of nonlegal sanctions used in Shasta county).
39. See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 958-68 (1997) (presenting a model of social norms based on personal commitment).
40. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 376-381 (1997) (arguing that some social norms are internalized).
41. Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 476, 477 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (noting that people avoid stealing wallets due to the social norm involved and not due to potential legal liability).
42. See Icek Ajzen, From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior, in ACTION CONTROL: FROM COGNITION TO BEHAVIOR 11, 29-35 (Julius Kuhl & Jiirgen Beckmann eds., 1985) (suggesting that performance of intended behavior depends on certain factors "only partly under volitional control," including willpower, ability to control factors that may prevent performance, attitudes, subjective norms, and influence of past behavior). A possible limitation of measuring all these items at once is multicollinearity- correlations among the factors may make it difficult to determine their separate effects and the ordering of the variables may affect the results.
43. See, e.g., Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (2006) (noting that "[contracts are never fully complete, because some contractual incompleteness is inevitable, given the costs of thinking about, bargaining over, and drafting for future contingencies").
44. For a recent review of the literature, see Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty ' Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663, 6 6 5 - 6 8 (2004).
45. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing the concept of penalty default rules that incentivize parties to reveal private information by offering the parties default rules that penalize them).
46. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (arguing that default rules should fit the preferences of the majority of contracting parties, thus countering the interests of the minority);
47. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,474 (1980) (arguing that contract rules should be used to redistribute wealth, thus systematically functioning against the interests of the wealthy).
48. See Yuval Feldman, Five Models of Regulatory Compliance Motivation, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (David Levi-Faur ed., forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6-7) (on file with authors) (reviewing the literature on regulatory compliance and suggesting state laws enjoy some assumed legitimacy so that they operate within societal expectation).
49. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 358-372 (2000) (arguing that state law has the power to signal what are the shared beliefs of members of society regarding a certain act).
50. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1585 (2005) (comparing standard-form contracts and default rules).
51. See Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance 26-27 (July 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
52. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429,435-37 (2002).
53. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1443256 (showing that household consumers hardly ever read standard-form contracts when they engage in online transactions).
54. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 628-30 (2002) (reviewing the tension between promise-based theories of contract and standard-form contracts). To be sure, we make no claim as to the normative validity of this point of view. All that we conjecture is that some subjects may rationalize their actions in this fashion. For a discussion on the normative implications of asymmetric information in standard-form contracts.
55. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1250-55 (1983) (arguing that courts should distinguish between visible and invisible terms).
56. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979) (arguing that an informed minority of marginal consumers can overcome information gaps).
57. P. Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Participation in Task Selection: The Role of Control in Mediating Justice Judgments, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1148 (1987)
58. Jerald Greenberg & Robert Folger, Procedural Justice, Participation, and the Fair Process Effect in Groups and Organizations, in BASIC GROUP PROCESSES 235 (Paul B. Paulus ed., 1983)
59. Kwok Leung & Wai-Kwan Li, Psychological Mechanisms of Process-Control Effects, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 613 (1990).
60. Shelley E. Taylor & Lien B. Pham, Mental Simulation, Motivation, and Action, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACTION: LINKING COGNITION AND MOTIVATION TO BEHAVIOR 219, 229 (Peter M.Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh eds., 1996)
61. Suzanne C. Thompson, Will It Hurt Less if I Can Control It? A Complex Answer to a Simple Question, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 89, 9 7 - 9 8 (1981) (discussing relationship between control and future outcomes).
62. ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY, 469-70(1986)
63. Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will?, 74 J. PERSONALITY 1557, 1562-68 (2006)
64. Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 203, 207-08 (1959)
65. William N. Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors, 20 J. FIN. RES. 145, 147-50 (1997) (discussing investors' misperceptions of the past performance of their mutual funds as a personal justification for inaction).
66. Cary Coglianese, Response, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 435-36 (2001) (discussing how cognitive dissonance may improve evaluation of a law when community members have set forth effort towards its framing).
67. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943) (noting that contracts of adhesion allow firms "to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms").
68. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 787-98 (1982) (presenting a taxonomy of the nature of the bargaining that takes place based on the types of parties and commodities).
69. See, e.g.. Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 247 (1970) (noting that "[disparity in bargaining power between parties to standard-form contracts is a universally recognized problem"). For a criticism of the simplistic usage of the concept of unequal bargaining power and a suggested analytical model for intervention in the freedom of contract based on distributive, paternalistic, and efficiency arguments.
70. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 570-75 (1982).
71. See, e.g., Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help 30 (Jan. 5, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1157083.
72. See Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling "Holier Than Thou": Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 861 (2000). To some extent, the fact that participants differed systematically with respect to variables that measured self-related attitudes and did not with respect to measures of others reassures us as to the internal validity of our questionnaires and the careful reading of our respondents. For a discussion of the possible effects of this perception gap in legal contexts.
73. see Robert Cooter, Michal Feldman & Yuval Feldman, The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 8 8 9 ( 2 0 0 8 ).
74. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 928 n.3 (2010) (reviewing the evidence on the prevalence of contract disputes that stem from interpretation).
75. Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 388 (2007). For a review of the case law.
76. See, e.g., William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 631, 641-42 (noting that "fail[ing] to implement the expectations that the parties formed at the time of formation [is] a legitimate autonomy concern").
77. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 431-32 (2000) (presenting a comprehensive overview of different objective theories). For a review of objective interpretation in several common law jurisdictions.
78. KIM LEWISON, THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS 24-29 (4th ed. 2007).
79. For a theoretical argument along these lines, see STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 173(2009).
80. David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 457-66 (2009).
81. Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 176, 178-84 (Omri Ben-Shahared., 2007).
82. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing the impact of community intuition on attempts to reform criminal law)
83. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003) (discussing the limitations of the deterrence model of criminal law)
84. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1997) (advocating a criminal law that reflects "the community's perception of just desert").
85. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 579 (2006).
86. For examples of recent contributions to this debate, see Symposium, Default Rules in Private and Public Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 557 (2006).
87. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) (presenting a consent-based justification for the use of default terms).
88. See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1631-32 (2009) (noting that "[w]ith a few possible exceptions, contract default rules are best understood as attempts to impute into contracts terms that most similarly situated parties would have wanted to include had they considered them" (footnote omitted)).
89. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Essay, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 839 (2003) (arguing that "[c]hoosing a majoritarian default rule reduces the negative consequences of high transaction costs").
90. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 738-742 (1992)
91. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 626-39 (1990).
92. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 596 (2003) (assuming that "[i]n a world of free contracting, unpopular defaults thus will raise contracting costs but not otherwise affect parties' behavior").
93. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 1 - 5 (2008) (introducing the theory of "libertarian paternalism" in the context of using the design of a cafeteria to influence students' food choices)
94. Guthrie C. Panacea or pandora's box?: The costs of options in negotiation 88. Iowa L. Rev. 601: 634-638: 2003.
95. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557(1992).
96. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 553-58 (2000) (reviewing the reasons for the use of standards throughout the U.C.C.).
97. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Response, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1597 n.21 (1999) (alluding to the possibility that contracting parties might free ride on courts' ex post efforts).
98. Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision To Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123,127 (1988).
99. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 831-33 (2006). According to Bebchuk and Posner, there is an asymmetry between the parties because drafters are routinely subject to reputational penalties whereas nondrafters (usually consumers) are not.
100. Rachel S. Amow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1209 (2001) (citation omitted).
101. Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 307 (2004) (documenting the phenomenon in the area of environmental regulation)
102. Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005) (analyzing workplace safety regulations and arguing that policies should encourage employers to go beyond compliance).
103. Compare Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381, 399 (1990) (defending limits on contract damages as efficient)
104. Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 383-87 (1990) (criticizing the legal regulation of liquidated damages).
105. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, Attitudes and Behavior, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 102 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
106. See, e.g., Icek Ajzen & Nicole Gilbert Cote, Attitudes and the Prediction of Behavior, in ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 289, 3 0 3 - 0 4 (William D. Crano & Radmila Prislin eds., 2008) (reviewing various empirical studies showing that specific behaviors can be predicted based on corresponding intentions)
107. Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior, in THE HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES 173, 187-96 (Dolores Albarraci'n et al. eds., 2005) (providing a detailed overview of research substantiating predictive validity of behavioral intentions, including theory of reasoned action and theory of planned behavior).
108. William D. Crano & Radmila Prislin, Attitudes and Persuasion, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345, 360(2006).
109. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 188 (2000).
110. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113,140 (1996).
111. Scholz J.T. Voluntary compliance and regulatory enforcement. Law & Pol'Y. 1984.6. 385. 388-389. For a more focused study on the effect of various enforcement probabilities in contracts.
112. Bohnet I., Frey B.S., Huck S. More order with less law: on contract enforcement, trust, and crowding. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 2001. 95. 131 (demonstrating in a series of lab experiments that low probabilities of enforcement increase trustworthiness both in the short run and in the long run). For a broader discussion of perceptual studies of how people treat the certainty of punishment and enforcement.
113. For a discussion of the enforcement dilemma that policymakers face with special focus on the problematic message firms receive from high enforcement rates
114. Scholz J.T., Voluntary compliance and regulatory enforcement, 6, Law & Pol'Y. 385, 388-389(1984).
115. Bohnet I.,Frey B.S., Huck S. More order with less Law: On contract enforcement, trust, and crowding 95. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131 (2001) (demonstrating in a series of lab experiments that low probabilities of enforcement increase trustworthiness both in the short run and in the long run). For a broader discussion of perceptual studies of how people treat the certainty of punishment and enforcement.
116. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 326-27 (198 0 ).
117. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). For a later description of the theory and the findings upon which it is grounded
118. Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1117-19(2003).