Contract as agreement

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 353-408

  Solan, Lawrence M ^a  

^a Center for the Study of Law Language and Cognition

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38349174829     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (259)

1. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
2. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2, 83-89 (1981).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c (1981).
4. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-57 (1936). The seminal work organizing contract law around reliance issues is GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins, 2d ed. 1974).
5. See, e.g., BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 9 (2005) ("This theory has dominated American contract law since the late nineteenth century . . . ."); CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 34 (5th ed. 2003) ("The substitution of an Objective' approach for the 'subjective' one previously taken by Anglo-American law in such cases is commonly said to be one of the central tenets of the classical contract law system.").
6. See, e.g., ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 39-40 (2004); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACT LAW § 2.2, at 26-28 (5th ed. 2003); W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES 20 (1996).
7. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 115 (4th ed. 2004) ("By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had become ascendant and courts universally accept it today. In the words of a distinguished federal judge, '"intent" does not invite a tour through [the plaintiffs] cranium, with [the plaintiff] as the guide.'" (quoting Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987))); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:1, at 241 (4th ed. 1990) ("[A]s a general principle, the inquiry will focus not on the question of whether the subjective minds of the parties have met, but on whether their outward expression of assent is sufficient to form a contract."); see also 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.12, at 628 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) ("The cases demonstrate plainly enough that a person's expressions as understood by the other party, may bind the person even though the person's own intention and meaning were different."). Corbin, however, expressed doubt about the viability of such a theory, given that the plain meaning of a text is only plain by virtue of its uncontroversially reflecting the intent of the drafter, which, of course, is a subjective matter. See id., § 4.12, at 628.
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981); see also discussion infra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
9. Id. § 18 ("Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.").
10. Id. § 2(1) ("A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.").
11. Id. § 21 ("Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.").
12. For recent examples, see Bock v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 257 F.3d 700, 708 (7th Cir. 2001); Raye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., Nos. 94-6218 & 94-6305, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3352, at *22 n.17 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1996); Ferranti International, PLC v. Jasin, No. 98-CV-5412, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6663, at *25 n.5 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2000), rev'd, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3691 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 2001); Travelers Property & Casualty Co. v. Restortek, Inc., No. 98 C 3438, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2034, at *2 (N.D. 111. Feb. 18, 2000); Time Warner Sports Merchandising v. Chicagoland Processing Corp., No. 95 C 1364, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 491, at *5-6 (N.D. 111. Jan. 9, 1998); Agroindustria Nacional, S.A. v. Henry Brach & Co., 976 F. Supp. 758, 760 n.3 (N.D. 111. 1997); and Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.6 (Tex. App. 2000).
13. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law of Satisfaction" - A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 361 (1995); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1757 (2000); Chad McCracken, Hegeland the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REV. 719, 737 (1999); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 78-79 (1994); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 440 n.3 (1993); Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the Fat Lady Sing?: An Analysis of "Agreements in Principle" in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 132 n.27 (1986).
14. For a historical perspective on the development of the objective theory, see Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428-29 (2000). There is extensive commentary on this history, with considerable disagreement among scholars as to its course. See GILMORE, supra note 4, at 39-59; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 180-88 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1977) (documenting the continued existence of the subjective will theory into the late nineteenth century). For some recent commentary, see Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 305-16 (1997); Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion or: What Is So Problematic in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 545, 553-59 (2002). All agree that Holmes and Williston played important roles in bringing about the final victory of this approach in American law in the early twentieth century, see GILMORE, supra note 4, at 21-30; HORWITZ, supra, at 90, 200, 237; DiMatteo, supra, at 296-97; Mautner, supra, at 551-52 & n.25; Perillo, supra, at 443-44, although there is considerable disagreement about the earlier roots of this approach. I will not recount the different versions of this history here.
15. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); NBC Universal, Inc. v. Paxson Commc'ns Corp., No. 650-N, 2005 De. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Faulkner v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 A.2d 734, 739 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
16. See supra notes 5-7, 15 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
19. For discussion of this potential overcompensation, see Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1494-96 (2004).
20. Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL. L. REV. 441, 444-45 (1929).
21. Formation estoppel differs from promissory estoppel in that it does not require that the promisee act or refrain from acting in reliance on the promise. It requires only that the promisee reasonably understood the promisor to have committed himself to his word. For discussion of the differences, see infra Part III.A.
22. 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
23. Id. at 777.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 778.
29. Asia Pac. Indus. Corp. v. Rainforest Café, Inc., 380 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers, LLC, 677 N.W.2d 94, 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)).
30. See, e.g., J.F. McKinney & Assocs. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Illinois uses an objective theory of contract under which understandings and beliefs are effective only if shared."); see also NBC Universal, Inc. v. Paxson Commc'ns Corp., No. 650-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *14 (Bel. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) ("Delaware adheres to the Objective' theory of contracts, i.e. a contract's construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party."); Barchowsky v. Silver Farms, Inc., 659 A.2d 347, 355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) ("Maryland follows the objective theory of contract interpretation. . . . '[C]ontractual intent is determined in accordance with what a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time of the agreement would have intended by the language used.'" (quoting Faulkner v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 A.2d 734, 739 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991))); Mealand v. E.N.M. Med. Cir., 33 P.3d 285, 289 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) ("New Mexico adheres to the objective theory of contracts."); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 66 Va. Cir. 135, 154 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004) ("[Objective theory . . . controls in Virginia . . . ."); Sykes v. Ellenburg Capital Corp., No. 22772-0-II, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 671, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1999) ("Washington adheres to the Objective theory' of contracts, requiring the court to examine the parties' objective manifestations rather than their subjective intent."); Givens v. Fowler, 984 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Wyo. 1999) ("In Wyoming, we examine the objective manifestations of the parties' contractual intent to determine whether a contract was formed.").
31. See, e.g., J.F. McKinney & Assors., 183 F.3d at 622-23.
32. Speech Act Theory describes these perspectives on the same act of speech as a matter of "illocutionary force" on the one hand, and "perlocutionary effect," on the other. Loosely, the former characterizes the speaker's intent, the latter the hearer's understanding. Many legally relevant speech acts require analysis from both perspectives. For example, fraud requires scienter on behalf of the defendant, and both reasonable and actual reliance on behalf of the plaintiff. The seminal work is J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marian Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975).
33. I am grateful to Michael Cahill, who first pointed this possibility out to me.
34. Contrast this position with that of FRIED, supra note 2, at 16.
35. See. supra note 1 and accompanying text.
36. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
37. TKO Equip. Co. v. C & G Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
38. 98 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1953).
39. Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
40. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1139 (Ariz. 1993) (quoting Polk v. Koerner, 553 P.2d 660, 662 (Ariz. 1975) (citation omitted)).
41. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 858-59 (1992).
42. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 7.9, at 448.
43. Actually, I've overstated this point. In cases involving the parol evidence rule, a court may not concern itself with questions of either party's state of mind, which may allow such contracts to be enforced, notwithstanding that neither party had any intent with respect to particular terms. In such cases, it can he said that the parties at the very least intended to be bound by the contract as a whole.
44. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 cmt. b (1932).
45. 3 CORBIN, supra note 7, § 539, at 81. Corbin also expressed the same idea, "No contract should ever be interpreted and enforced with a meaning that neither party gave it." Id. § 572B, at 66.
46. Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505, 509 (Or. 1977).
47. Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 27 n.4 (2d Cir. 1988).
48. Utica City Nat'l Bank v. Gunn, 118 N.E. 607, 608 (N.Y. 1918).
49. Id. (citation omitted).
50. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1124-26 (1984), for a discussion. Similarly, Barneu recognizes that under these circumstances, "the objective interpretation of a party's acts will yield . . . to proof of a different subjective understanding of one or both parties." Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 307 (1986).
51. The risk of such a result is what has led to a softening of the parol evidence rule over the decades. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202(1) (a) (2004) (stating a relaxed parol evidence rule that generally permits evidence of course of dealing or usage of trade to explain conduct inconsistent with the contract's clear language); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998). For a good illustration in the context of the UCC, see American Machine & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Manufacturing Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 596-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
52. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
53. 249 A.2d 414, 416-17 (R.I. 1969). My thanks to Ian Ayres for bringing this case to my attention.
54. Id. at 415.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 416.
60. Id. at 415.
61. Id. at 415-16.
62. Id. at 417.
63. See id.
64. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
65. Barnett, supra note 50, at 273.
66. Id. at 302-03.
67. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
68. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897).
69. See infra Part III.D.
70. For discussion of such cases, see Keith A. Rowley, You Asked far It, You Got It. . . Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 527-30, 536-38, 546-52, 554 (2003).
71. 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
72. Id. at 89.
73. Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
74. Leonard, 210 F.3d at 88-89.
75. 778 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985). The case is discussed by Professor Rowley, supra note 70, at 549-50.
76. Newman, 778 F.2d at 461.
77. Id. at 462.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 462-63.
80. Id. at 463 n.6.
81. Id. at 463.
82. See id. at 461-66.
83. Id. at 466 ("A reasonable person listening to the news rebroadcast could not conclude that the above language-'calls this show'-constituted a new offer; rather than what it actually was, a newsreport of the offer previously made, which had already expired.").
84. Id. at 466-67.
85. For examples, see Rowley, supra note 70, at 539-43, 546. The title of Rowley's article refers to Berry v. Gulf Coast Wings, Inc., No. 01-2642 (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct. filed July 24, 2001 ). In Berry, a waitress at a Hooters restaurant alleged that she was promised a new Toyota for job performance, but was given a new "toy Yoda" instead. See Initial Complaint at 1-3, Berry v. Gulf Coast Wings, Inc., No. 01-2642 (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct. July 24, 2001 ), available at http://news.corporate.fmdlaw. com/hdocs/docs/hooters/berrygcw72401cmp.pdf. The article's title also refers to Gill v. Cumulus Media, Inc., No. 05-CI-2740 (Fayette Cir. Ct. filed June 22, 2005). In Gill, the plaintiff alleged that a radio advertisement promised "100 Grand," but gave her a candy bar with that name instead of the money she expected. See Complaint at 1-2, Gill v. Cumulus Media, Inc., No. 05-CI-2740 (Fayette Cir. Ct. June 22, 2005), available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/0623051grandl.html. Thanks to Professor Ronald Chen for bringing this matter to my attention through the contract professors listserve. Closer to home for legal academics, Professor Alan Dershowitz raised a stir when he promised on MSNBC's Scarborough Country. "Tell you what. I will give $10,000 to the P.L.O. in your name if you can find a historical fact in my book that you can prove to be false." Scarborough Country (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2003). On a subsequent radio program, Democracy Now, Norman Finkelstein claimed to have found various erroneous statements; Dershowitz claimed that his offer was limited to a "material, willful, distortion." Democracy Now (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 24, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.democracynow.org/static/dershowitzFin.shtml). To the best of my knowledge, this offer has not resulted in litigation.
86. Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1124-26.
87. See Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (defining consideration).
89. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
90. For detailed analytical discussion, see IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES 143-45 (2005).
91. Medex v. McCabe, 811 A.2d 297, 305-06 (Md. 2002) (citation omitted).
92. See Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a covenant not to compete, signed after employment commenced, but without new consideration, was invalid).
93. Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 99 S.W. 1111 (Tex. 1907).
94. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 2.10, at 68; see also CORBIN, supra note 7, § 3.5, at 326-30 ("There is no power of acceptance by one to whom the offer is wholly unknown.").
95. For discussion of the history of the tension between bargain-based theories and reliance-based theories of contract, see ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 7-77 (1998); Barnett, supra note 50, at 287-89; Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Penis of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1228-29 (1998).
96. See RICHARD NISBETI & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE 18-23 (1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, m JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 11-14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
97. P.N. Johnson-Laird, Causation, Mental Models, and the Law, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 69-80 (1999).
98. Id. at 71.
99. Id. at 80-83.
100. Others have also noted that the availability of information can lead to errors in judgment about causality. See, e.g., NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 96, at 22-23.
101. For recent discussion of such problems, see Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 890-99 (2006).
102. Rakoff, supra note 13, at 80-81.
103. Id. at 81.
104. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (2006).
105. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-24 (1972). I am very grateful to David Reiss for pointing out the similarities in the structure of the arguments.
106. Id. at 1105-15.
107. Id. at 1089-93.
108. Id. at 1105-10.
109. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
110. Id. at 704-05.
111. Id. at 707.
112. See id. at 707-08.
113. See discussion infra Part III.B.
114. See, e.g., infra note 188.
115. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
116. Examination of the similarities and differences between the two judicial endeavors can be instructive. See generally Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199, 221-42 (1988) (comparing and contrasting "the use of parol evidence in contract interpretation with the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation"); Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859, 860, 866-79 (2004) (discussing problems of ambiguity "in both statutory and contractual interpretation").
117. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 391 F.3d 551, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Under [North Carolina] law, as under general principles of contract law, our task is to 'give ordinary words their ordinary meanings.'" (quoting Internet E., Inc. v. Duro Commc'ns, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 84, 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001))); Cantonbury Heights Condo. Ass'n v. Local Land Dev., L.L.C., 873 A.2d 898, 904 (Conn. 2005) ("We accord the language employed in the contract a rational construction based on its common, natural and ordinary meaning and usage as applied to the subject matter of the contract.").
118. As for the ordinary meaning rule reflecting legislative intent in the interpretation of statutes, see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) ("The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly 'begin with the language employed by CONGRESS and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."' (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 54, 57 (1990))); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Rolf of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 456-57 (2005).
119. City of Golden v. Simpson, 83 P.3d 87, 93 (Colo. 2004) (en bane) (citations omitted).
120. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 825, 828 (Idaho 2005) ("The meaning of the insurance policy and the intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the insurance policy's own words."); ARY Jewelers, L.L.C. v. Krigel, 82 P.3d 460, 466 (Kan. 2003) ("The cardinal rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention. . . . The intent of the parties is determined based on the contract alone, not on extrinsic or parol evidence. . . . Words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning." (quoting Armstrong Bus. Servs. v. H & R Block, 96 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted))); Batshon v. Mar-Que Gen. Contractors, Inc., 624 N.W.2d 903, 906 n.4 (Mich. 2001) ("If the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language."); Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn. 2003) ("[T] he primary goal of contract interpretation is to determine and enforce the intent of the parties. Where the parties express their intent in unambiguous words, those words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning." (citations omitted)).
121. Alltel Corp. v. Sumner, 203 S.W.Sd 77, 80 (Ark. 2005); see also Hill-Shafer P'ship v. Chilson Family Trust, 799 P.2d 810, 814-15 (Ariz. 1990) (en bane) ("It is well-established that before a binding contract is formed, the parties must mutually consent to all material terms. . . . Importantly, however, mutual assent is based on objective evidence, not on the hidden intent of the parties." (citations omitted)); Avemco Ins. Co. v. N. Colo. Air Charter, 38 P.3d 555, 564 (Colo. 2002) (requiring "meeting of the minds through objective manifestation of mutual assent").
122. See Solan, supra note 118, at 456-57.
123. United States v. Donovan, 348 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he best evidence of the parties' intent is the plain language of the policy ...."); In re Osborne, 763 N.E.2d 855, 857 (111. App. Ct. 2002) ("The language of the marital agreement is the best indication of the parties' intent.").
124. See NOAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND 30 (2000). For discussion of this issue in some detail, see Solan, supra note 116, at 869-71.
125. Rakoff, supra note 13, at 78.
126. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1598-99 (2005).
127. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (emphasis added).
128. Professor Eisenberg notes this aspect of the holding in Embry. "The appeals court made clear, however, that the reasonable meaning of McKittrick's expression was determinative only if Embry's subjective understanding coincided with that meaning." Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1125.
129. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
130. Id. at 518.
131. Id. at 517-518.
132. Id. at 518.
133. Id. at 519.
134. Id. at 518.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 521 ("In the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, 'We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and unexpressed intention.'" (quoting First Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1937))).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 518. My thanks to Ian Ayres for bringing this fact to my attention. 139 561 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). I learned of this case from an internet posting by Professor John Gedid.
139. Id. at 1249.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1251.
142. Id. at 1250.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981).
144. It is possible to read this provision as requiring only that the manifestation be clear enough to allow an inference that a commitment has been made, even if the promisee does not do so, but courts do not appear to adopt this meaning.
145. Barnett, supra note 41, at 305.
146. Id. at 302.
147. Barnett, supra note 50, at 307-308, 321.
148. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (1994).
149. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 3.6, at 114-17; Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Ownership, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 123, 148-49 (2002).
150. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 156 (1989); James Boyle, Inegal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 386 n.67 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic Structure of the Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (2004).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 71 (1981).
152. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form, " 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 145 (2000); Whittier, supra note 20, at 441-49.
153. Whittier, supra note 20, at 442.
154. Id. at 445.
155. Put in other terms, Whittier would allow greater damages when the parties did not have common knowledge of second- and third-order information. See id. at 444. If one party did not agree to enter into a contract, and knows that the other party thinks that an agreement has been reached, the law treats the situation as though this disparity in knowledge were not the case, and does so to the disadvantage of the party who attempted to take advantage of the situation. See generally Ian Ayres and Barry J. Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1631 (1997) (arguing that in some situations ignorance of higher-order information can preclude strategic bargaining and make negotiations more efficient).
156. Markovits, supra note 19, at 1497-514.
157. Id. at 1504.
158. Id.
159. Christopher T. Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and the Two Contractual Wrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 68-69 (2001). For an alternative view, which distinguishes between opportunistic and nonopportunistic breaches, see generally George M. Cohen, Finding Fault with Wonnell's "Two Contractual Wrongs, " 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137 (2001).
160. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
162. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 52.
163. Warren A. Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913, 926 (1951).
164. 133 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Wis. 1965).
165. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 3.26, at 196-97.
166. James Gordley, Enforcing Promues, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547, 568-70 (1995).
167. Compare W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197, 199 (1990) (arguing that "estoppel damages should be limited by the reliance measure"), with Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 604-06 (1998) (demonstrating the crucial importance of reliance in promissory estoppel cases).
168. Gregory Klass brought this point up in a personal communication with me.
169. Professor Rakoff makes note of this difference. See Rakoff, supra note 13, at 81.
170. See Whittier, supra note 20, at 444-45.
171. E.F. Drew & Co. v. Reinhard, 170 F.2d 679, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1948).
172. In re Walker, 93 F.2d 281, 283 (2nd Cir. 1937).
173. See, e.g., Vines v. Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co., 171 F.2d 487, 492 (2d Cir. 1948); Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1948); First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Irving Trust Co., 74 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir. 1934).
174. Arboireau v. Adidas-Salomon AG, 347 F.3d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Canby v. Rinkes, 902 P.2d 605, 610 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)).
175. Newton v. Newton, 86 P.3d 49, 52 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
176. Care Med. Equip., Inc. v. Baldwin, 15 P.3d 561, 563 (Or. 2000) (en bane) (citing Pettigrove v. Corvallis Lumber Mfg. Co., 21 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Or. 1933)).
177. Arlington Educ. Ass'n v. Arlington Sch. Dist. No. 3, 103 P.3d 1138, 1143 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Or. Sch. Employee Ass'n v. Rainier Sch. Dist. No. 13, 808 P.2d 83, 87 (Or. 1991); Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1997)).
178. Compare Asia Pac. Indus. Corp. v. Rainforest Café, Inc., 380 F.3d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 2004) ("'Minnesota follows the objective theory of contract formation, under which an outward manifestation of assent is determinative, rather than a party's subjective intent.'" (quoting TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers, LLC, 677 N.W.2d 94, 102 (Minn. Q. App. 2004))), with Webb Bus. Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Elecs. & Entm't Corp., 617 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Minn. 2000) ("The agreement necessary to form a contract need not be express, but may be implied from circumstances that clearly and unequivocally indicate the intention of the parties to enter into a contract.").
179. Compare Quality Truck & Auto Sales, Inc. v. Yassine, 730 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Ala. 1999) ("Courts generally accept the Objective theory' of contracts, which determines the existence of a contract based on 'the external or objective appearance of the parties' intentions as manifested by their actions.'" (quoting FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 3.6, at 114)), with FabArc Steel Supply, Inc. v. Composite Constr. Sys., 914 So. 2d 344, 358 (Ala. 2005) ("'[T]he intention of the party to a contract controls its interpretation and ... to ascertain such intention, regard must be had to the subject matter, the relationship of the parties at the time of the contract, and the law which it is justly inferable they had in view while contracting.'" (quoting G.F.A. Peanut Ass'n v. W.F. Covington Planter Co., 192 So. 502, 506 (Ala. 1939))).
180. Compare Hendricks v. Knik Supply, Inc., 522 P.2d 543, 548 (Alaska 1974) (Erwin, J., dissenting) ("We purport to follow the objective theory of contract interpretation . . . ."), with Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 657 P.2d 831, 835 (Alaska 1982) ("Given such an ambiguity in the agreement, the primary function of judicial interpretation should be to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties."). 182 Compare Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 947 (Wyo. 1999) ("Under the objective theory of assent, which courts, including this one, generally accept today, one looks 'to the external objective appearance of the parties' intentions as manifested by their actions.'" (quoting FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, §3.6 at 114)), with Hutchison v. Hill, 3 P.3d 242, 245 (Wyo. 2000) ("Most importantly, '[w]e seek to determine and effectuate the intention of the parties . . . .'" (quoting Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1996))).
181. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 271, 275.
182. Id. at 276.
183. I put aside here issues such as letters of intent and agreements to agree, where it is not clear whether the original discussions actually constituted an enforceable promise.
184. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (1954) ("If the words or other acts of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial . . . . 'The law, therefore, judges of an agreement between two persons exclusively from those expressions of their intentions which are communicated between them.'" (quoting WILLIAM LAWRENCE CLARK ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3, at 4 (4th ed. 1931))).
185. For a recent illustration of that rule, see Davis v. G.N. Mortgage Corp., 396 F.3d 869, 878 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Illinois adheres to a 'four corners rule' of contract interpretation, which provides that 'an agreement, when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it. It speaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from the language used.'" (quoting Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (111. 1999))). 188 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 87 (1965) (noting that the objective theory "insisted that the law enforce only the objective manifestations of agreement and rejected the notion that the essence of an enforceable contract was a subjective 'meeting of the minds' of the parties"); Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 841 (1993) ("[T]he so-called Objective theory of contract' has almost universally replaced the 'meeting of the minds' standard.").
186. For some recent examples, see Newsome v. Protective. Industrial Insurance Co., 890 So. 2d 81, 87 (Ala. 2003) ("Like any other contract, a valid accord and satisfaction requires consideration and a meeting of the minds regarding the subject matter."); Janusauskas v. Fichman, 793 A.2d 1109, 1 114 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) ("'[T]here must be a meeting of the minds between the parties . . . .'" (quoting Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 717 A.2d 811, 813 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998))); and Potts Construction Co. v. North Koolmai Water District, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (Idaho 2005) ("The minds of the parties must meet as to all the terms before a contract is formed." (citation omitted)).
187. For example, a Lexis search ("meeting w/3 mind") yielded 948 hits for the year 2006 over state and federal court decisions, and exceeded the maximum of 3,000 hits for the first seven years of the decade.
188. See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Under New York law, '[t]he fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties' intent.'" (quoting Greenfield v. Phillies Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (2002) (footnote omitted))); MPACT Constr. Group, LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ind. 2004) ("Whether the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes is a matter of contract interpretation, and most importantly, a matter of the parties' intent."); Hartig Drug Co. v. Hartig, 602 N.W.Sd 794, 797 (Iowa 1999) ("A cardinal rule of contract construction or interpretation is the intent of the parties must control."); ARY Jewelers, L.L.C. v. Krigel, 82 P.3d 460, 466 (Kan. 2003) ("The cardinal rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention." (quoting Armstrong Bus. Servs. V. H & R Block, 96 S.W.Sd 867, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002))), rev'd on other grounds,
189. See Golden Pac. Bancorp v. FDIC, 273 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2001); Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 93 (3d Cir. 2001); Bass v. Parsons (In re Parsons), 272 B.R. 735, 753 (D. Colo. 2001); see also Poole v. City of Waterbury, 831 A.2d 211, 224 (Conn. 2003) ("[A] contract must be constructed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined . . . in the light of the situation . . . and the circumstances connected with the transaction.").
190. Bohler-Uddeholm, 247 F.3d at 92-93 (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)); see Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980).
191. See Thatcher v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 397 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Webb v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 2000); LDCircuit, LLC v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1255-56 (D. Kan. 2005); Beattie v. State ex rel. Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 382 (Okla. 2002).
192. LDCircuit, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1255-56 (quoting Ryco Packaging Corp. v. Chappelle Int'l, Ltd., 926 P.2d 669, 674 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996)) (citations omitted).
193. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLWEWLLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 302-40 (1973).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
195. This has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly literature over the decades. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 4, at 95-112; Peter A. Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39 (2001); Barnett, supra note 50; Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "invisible Handshake, "52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 925-45 (1985); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 815-19 (1941); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 46; Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 169-75 (2000); Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the- Question of Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1950 (2001).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
197. Id. § 24.
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (2).
200. Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2001).
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
202. 924 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1991).
203. Id. at 614.
204. Id. at 613.
205. Id. at 614.
206. Id. at 613.
207. Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[F]orbearance to assert a valid claim, if bargained for, is sufficient consideration to support a contract."); Romero v. Earl, 810 P.2d 808, 810 (N.M. 1991) ("Consideration adequate to support a promise is essential to enforcement of the contract and must be bargained for by the parties.").
210. See, e.g., Bennett v. Emerson Elec. Co., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (D. Kan. 2002); Standard Mgmt., Inc. v. Kekona, 53 P.3d 264, 275 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001).
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
212. Peter Meijes Tiersma, Comment, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 189, 224 (1986). Tiersma uses the expression "illocutionary intent" to describe this fact. Id.
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 217 AYRES & KLASS, supra note 90, at 202.
214. See id. at 21-26.
215. Holmes, supra note 68, at 462.
216. See HILLMAN, supra note 95, at 224-36; see aim infra note 261.
217. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
218. Id. at 890.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 891.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Phoenix Office Sys., Inc. v. Kopp, No. 92-1877, 1993 Wise. App. LEXIS 425, at *7-10 (Wise. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1993).
227. See Am. Cont'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ranier Constr. Co., 607 P.2d 372, 375 (Ariz. 1980); Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. 1995).
228. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
229. Id. at 214.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 214-15 (citation omitted).
233. See, e.g., R.I. Charities Trust v. Engelhard Corp., 109 F. Supp. 2d 66, 78 (D.R.I. 2000) (implying good faith in order to effectuate the intent of the parties).
234. See, e.g., Hold Bros. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[U]nder New York law, a court may fill the gap in order to effectuate the intent of the parties."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tan, 691 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (S.D. Cal. 1988) ("[T] he court has a duty to fill in the gaps of the contract to preserve and effectuate the overall intentions of the contracting parties.").
235. Posner, supra note 126, at 1586; see. also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) ("Ideally, the preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction."). 240 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96-98 (7th ed. 2007).
236. VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, Reading Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon with Help from the Kewpie Dolls, in FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 43, 62-67 (2006). Professor Goldberg also argues that Cardozo may have gotten the case wrong. Extrinsic evidence suggests that the parties may well have intentionally left open the extent of any efforts due in light of another agency contract of Wood's that had resulted in litigation. Id. at 50.
237. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Analysis of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minontarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1999) [herein-after Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian]; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 614 (1998).
238. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 239, at 971 (arguing that default rules promote efficiency by "eliminating the cost of negotiating every detail of the proposed argument").
239. Other legal systems appear to be more successful at reducing the burden on contracting parties through the codification of standard terms. See Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer Words?, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 889, 912-14 (2004).
240. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Majoritanan, supra note 242, at 1606.
241. U.C.C. § 2-206 (2006).
242. See, e.g., Elda Arnhold & Byzantio, L.L.C. v. Ocean Atl. Woodland Corp., 284 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that trade usage is helpful in coming to an understanding of the parties' intent); Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The precise function of'usage of trade' evidence is to provide circumstantial proof of the contracting parties' intent."); Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 854 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Ark. 1993) (suggesting that usage of trade is competent evidence of parties' intent); Buchholz Mortuaries. Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 113S.W.3d 192, 194 (Mo. 2003) (explaining that trade usage is a relevant far in determining the intent of parties).
243. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 750-51 (1999).
244. See, e.g., Maverick Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Barhurton City Sch. Disc. Bd. of Educ., 872 N.E.Sd 322, 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 784-85 (Wash. 2004).
245. The term "incorporation" is frequently used in the literature to describe the practice of absorbing trade practice into the constellation of contractual rights and obligations. See Bernstein, supra note 248, at 746-60; Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Social Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 377 (1997).
246. See U.C.C. S 2-314 (2006) (outlining implied warranty of merchantability); id. S 2-315 (outlining implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
247. See id. § 2-715(2) (consequential damages).
248. See id. § 2-207 (calling for such rules to supplement the actual agreement of the parties when they have agreed that a contract exists, but disagree on its terms); id. § 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties); id. § 2-719(3) (permitting parties to limit or exclude consequential damages).
249. For discussion, see generally TWINING, supra note 196 (detailing in depth Karl Llewellyn's and the Realist Movement's contextual approach to contract law); Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 214 (1966) ("Professor Karl Llewellyn implemented his ideas on the law of contract by imbedding them into the Uniform Commercial (lode in such a manner that they are now virtually inextricable."). For recent developments to the contrary, see Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 584 (2000).
250. See generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the, Klack Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 511, 520-83 (2004) (presenting research on the cognitive psychology topic o( "coherence-based reasoning" and applying it to the legal world).
251. Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a Neui Basis for Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1848-50 (2004).
252. Id. at 1867.
253. Ronald J. Mann, Commentary, Contracts - Only with Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1876 (2004).
254. Daniel Markovits, Commentary, The No-Retraction Principle and the Morality of Negotiations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1903, 1921 (2004).
255. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 256, at 1835.
256. For discussion of relational contract theory, see generally Symposium, Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2000) (discussing various aspects of relational contract theory) ; tewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (examining the "gap between the academic model of contract law and the system as it works" and calling for the establishment of a more complex model); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (discussing the relational theory of contract law as it applies to judicial gap-filling of incomplete contracts). For a helpful summary of this literature, see HILLMAN, supra note 95, at 241-66.
257. See Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 34 (2001).
258. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1787-95 (1996).
259. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illusions of Intention, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 116-40 (2005).