Cooperation without enforcement? A comparative analysis of litigation and online reputation as quality assurance mechanisms

Management Science

Volumn 57, Issue 11, 2011, Pages 1944-1962

  Bakos, Yannis ^a   Dellarocas, Chrysanthos ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Eputation and adverse selection; Litigation; Litigation and moral hazard; Private ordering; Reputation; Reputation and litigation trade off; Reputation in markets

Indexed keywords

ADVERSE SELECTION; LITIGATION; MORAL HAZARD; PRIVATE ORDERING; REPUTATION; REPUTATION AND LITIGATION TRADE-OFF; REPUTATION IN MARKETS;

COMMERCE; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; EFFICIENCY; GAME THEORY; QUALITY ASSURANCE; RISK MANAGEMENT;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

EID: 81255191046     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1390     Document Type: Article

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