Obtaining reliable feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 29, Issue , 2007, Pages 391-419

  Jurca, Radu ^a   Faltings, Boi ^a  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION THEORY; ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS; RELIABILITY THEORY; STATE FEEDBACK;

BUSINESS DECISIONS; ELECTRONIC MARKETS; SIDE-PAYMENT SCHEMES; TRUTHFUL REPORTS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 34748894825     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2243     Document Type: Article

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