Manipulation-resistant reputation systems

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 677-698

  Friedman, Eric ^a   Resnick, Paul ^b   Sami, Rahul ^b  

^a Cornell University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COST ITEMS; DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; LOW-QUALITY PRODUCTS; ONLINE SHOPPERS; REPUTATION SYSTEMS; STRATEGIC THREAT; SYBIL ATTACK;

EID: 84926072615     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.029     Document Type: Chapter

References (24)

1. A. Altman and M. Tennenholtz. Incentive compatible ranking systems, 2006. Available at: http://www.technion.ac.il/_alon_a/0incentive.pdf.
2. B. Awerbuch and R.D. Kleinberg. Competitive collaborative learning. In 18th Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT 2005), LNCS 3559:233–248. Springer, 2005.
3. R. Bhattacharjee and A. Goel. Avoiding ballot-stuffing in ebay-like reputation systems. In P2PECON ‘05: Proc. 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2005.
4. R. Bhattacharjee and A. Goel. Incentive based ranking mechanisms. In First Workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems (Netecon’06), pp. 62–68, 2006. Available at: http://www.cs.duke.edu/nicl/netecon06/papers/proceedings.pdf.
5. A. Cheng and E. Friedman. Sybilproof reputation mechanisms. In P2PECON ‘05: Proc. 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, pp. 128–132, 2005.
6. S. Chien, C. Dwork, R. Kumar, D. Simon, and D. Sivakumar. Link evolution: Analysis and algorithms. Internet Math., 1(3):277–304, 2003.
7. R. Cooke. Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science. Oxford University Press, 1991.
8. C. Dellarocas. Analyzing the economic efficiency of ebay-like online reputation reporting mechanisms. In Proc. 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2001.
9. C. Dellarocas. The digitization of word-of-mouth: Promise and challenges of online feedback mechanisms. Management Sci., 49(10):1407–1424, 2003.
10. D. Fudenberg and D. Levine. Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player. Econometrica, 57:759–778, 1989.
11. Z. Gyöngyi, H. Garcia-Molina, and J. Pedersen. Combating web spam with trustrank. In 13th Intl. Conf. Very Large Data Bases, pp. 576–587, 2004.
12. R. Jurca and B. Faltings. Minimum payments that reward honest feedback. In Proc. 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 190–199, 2006.
13. M. Kandori. Social norms and community enforcement. Rev. Econ. Stud., 59(1):63–80, 1992.
14. D. Kreps and R. Wilson. Reputation and imperfect information. J. Econ. Theory, 27(2):253–279, 1982.
15. K. Lai, M. Feldman, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica. Incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer systems. In First Workshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2003.
16. R. Levien. Attack-Resistant Trust Metrics. PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2004.
17. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts. Predation, reputation and entry deterrence. J. Econ. Theory, 27(2):280–312, 1982.
18. N. Miller, P. Resnick, and R. Zeckhauser. Eliciting honest feedback: The peer-prediction method. Management Sci., 51(9):1359–1373, 2005.
19. P. Resnick and E. Friedman. The social cost of cheap pseudonyms. J. Econ. Management Strategy, 10(2):173–199, 2001.
20. P. Resnick, R. Zeckhauser, E. Friedman, and K. Kuwabara. Reputation systems. Commun. ACM, 43(12):45–48, 2000.
21. M. Richardson, R. Agrawal, and P. Domingos. Trust management for the semantic Web. In Second International Semantic Web Conference, LNCS 2870: 351–368. Springer, 2003.
22. R. Selten. Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule. Exp. Econ., 1(1):43–62, 1998.
23. S. Tadelis. What’s in a name? Reputation as a tradeable asset. Amer. Econ. Rev., 89(3), 1999.
24. H. Zhang, A. Goel, R. Govindan, K. Mason, and B.V. Roy. Making eigenvector-based reputation systems robust to collusion. In Workshop on Algorithms and Models for theWeb Graph (WAW’04), 2004.