The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 549-584

  Drahozal, Christopher R ^a   Hylton, Keith N ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242635724     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/377054     Document Type: Review

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