Microfinance and social investment

Annual Review of Financial Economics

Volumn 3, Issue , 2011, Pages 407-434

  Conning, Jonathan ^a   Morduch, Jonathan ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

corporate governance; leverage; microcredit; prosocial behavior; social entrepreneurship

Indexed keywords

EID: 80955148152     PISSN: 19411367     EISSN: 19411375     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-financial-102710-144909     Document Type: Article

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