Is Grameen lending efficient? Repayment incentives and insurance in village economies

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 217-234

  Rai, Ashok S ^a   Sjöström, Tomas ^b  

^a WILLIAMS COLLEGE   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FINANCIAL PROVISION; GRAMEEN BANK; INSURANCE SYSTEM; RURAL ECONOMY; RURAL FINANCE;

ASIA; BANGLADESH; EURASIA; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 10744220190     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00282     Document Type: Article

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