Screening by the company you keep: Joint liability lending and the peer selection

Economic Journal

Volumn 110, Issue 465, 2000, Pages 601-631

  Ghatak, Maitreesh ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6244247321     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00556     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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