Group lending under asymmetric information

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 3-25

  Van Tassel, Eric ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

Group lending; Joint liability; Screening

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL MARKET; INFORMATION SYSTEM; LENDING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0033399937     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00034-6     Document Type: Article

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