Chapter 56 Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries

Handbook of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 3, Issue , 2007, Pages 2857-2908

  Conning, Jonathan ^a   Udry, Christopher ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

agricultural credit; financial intermediation; rural finance

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049087367     PISSN: 15740072     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0072(06)03056-8     Document Type: Review

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