Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 88, Issue , 2013, Pages 47-61

  Hayo, Bernd ^a   Voigt, Stefan ^b  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Constitutional change; Endogenous constitutions; Form of government; Relevance of leaders; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 80054116973     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.013     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., Why did the west extend the franchise?. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000), 1167–1199.
2. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review 91:4 (2001), 938–963.
3. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
4. Aghion, P., Alesina, A., Trebbi, F., Endogenous political institutions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004), 565–611.
5. Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J., Limongi, F., Przeworski, A., Classifying political regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development 31 (1996), 3–36.
6. Banks, A.S., 2004. Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive; distributed by Databanks International, Binghamton, NY.
7. Beard, C., An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States; with a New Introduction by Forrest Mc Donald. 1913/1986, Free Press, New York.
8. Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P., New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The database of Political Institutions. 2000, World Bank, Washington.
9. Blume, L., Müller, J., Voigt, S., Wolf, C., The economic effects of constitutions: Replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice 139 (2009), 197–225.
10. Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G., The Calculus of Consent—Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. 1962, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
11. Dollar, D., Fisman, R., Gatti, R., Are women really the fairer sex? Corruption and women in government. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 46:4 (2001), 423–429.
12. Dreher, Axel, Lamia, M., Lein, S., Somogyi, F., The impact of political leaders’ profession and education of reforms?. Journal of Comparative Economics 37:1 (2008), 169–193.
13. Fish, S., Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies. Journal of Democracy 17 (2006), 5–20.
14. Gallie, W., Essentially contested concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956), 167–198.
15. Ginsburg, T., Elkins, Z., Blount, J., Does the process of constitution-making matter?. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5 (2009), 201–223.
16. Gleditsch, N., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., Strand, H., Armed conflict 1946–2001: a new dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002), 615–637.
17. Goemans, H., Gleditsch, K., Chiozza, G., Introducing archigos: a dataset of political leaders. Journal of Peace Research 46 (2009), 269–283.
18. Göhlmann, S., Vaubel, Roland, The educational and professional background of central bankers and its effect on inflation: an empirically analysis. European Economic Review 51 (2007), 925–941.
19. Golder, M., Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2000. 2005 http://homepages.nyu.edu/∼mrg217/elections.html.
20. Hayo, B., Voigt, S., Determinants of constitutional change: why do countries change their form of government?. Journal of Comparative Economics 38:3 (2010), 283–305.
21. Hendry, D.F., Econometrics: Alchemy or Science?. 1993, Blackwell, Oxford.
22. Heston, A., Summers, R., Aten, B., Penn World Table Version 6.2. 2006, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania September.
23. Hume, D., 1777/1987. Essays—Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. and with a Foreword, Notes, and Glossary by Eugene F. Miller. Liberty Classics, Indianapolis.
24. Jones, B., Olken, B., Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, 835–864.
25. Lijphart, Arend, Democracies. 1984, Yale University Press, New Haven.
26. Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy—Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. 1999, Yale University Press, New Haven.
27. Lutz, Donald, Principles of Constitutional Design. 2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
28. Marshall, Monty G., Jaggers, Keith, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002: Dataset Users’ Manual. 2002, University of Maryland, MD.
29. Matsusaka, John, Direct democracy works. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (2005), 185–206.
30. McGuire, Robert, Ohsfeldt, Robert, Public choice analysis and the ratification of the constitution. Grofman, B., Wittman, D., (eds.) The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, 1989, Agathon, New York, 175–204.
31. Persson, T., Roland, G., Tabellini, G., Separation of powers and political accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997), 310–327.
32. Persson, T., Tabellini, G., The economic effects of constitutions. 2003, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
33. Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R., 2008. Endogenous Presidentialism. NBER Working Paper 14603.
34. Saarkees, M., The correlates of war data on war: an update to 1997?. Conflict Management and Peace Science 18:1 (2000), 123–144.
35. Vanhanen, T., Prospects of Democracy—A Study of 172 Countries. 1997, Routledge, London and New York.
36. Ticchi, D., Vindigni, A., Endogenous constitutions. Economic Journal 120 (2010), 1–39.
37. Vanhanen, Tatu, A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810–1998. Journal of Peace Research 37 (2000), 252–265.
38. Vanhanen, Tatu, Measures of Democracy 1810–2004 [Computer File]. FSD1289, Version 2.0 (2005-08-17). 2005, Finnish Social Science Data Archive [distributor], Tampere.
39. Voigt, S., Explaining Constitutional Change—A Positive Economics Approach 2005. 1999, Elgar, Cheltenham.
40. White, Halbert, A Heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48 (1980), 817–838.