The economic effects of constitutions: Replicating-and extending-persson and tabellini

Public Choice

Volumn 139, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 197-225

  Blume, Lorenz ^a   Müller, Jens ^a   Voigt, Stefan ^b,c   Wolf, Carsten ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL   (Germany)

^b PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Constitutional economics; Electoral rules; Fiscal policy; Form of government; Governance; Productivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 62949177657     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9389-4     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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