Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 283-305

  Hayo, Bernd ^a   Voigt, Stefan ^b,c  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Constitutional change; Endogenous constitutions; Form of government; Institutional dynamics; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956232006     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.007     Document Type: Article

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