The impact of political leaders' profession and education on reforms

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 169-193

  Dreher, Axel ^a,b,c   Lamla, Michael J ^c   Lein, Sarah M ^c   Somogyi, Frank ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^b CESifo ^*  (Germany)

^c KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Economic freedom; Economic policy; Leadership; Reforms

Indexed keywords

EID: 63249107525     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2008.08.005     Document Type: Article

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