Bashing and supporting central banks: The Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 923-939

  Maier, Philipp ^a   Bezoen, Saskia ^a  

^a DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bundesbank; European Central Bank; External pressure; Public support

Indexed keywords

EID: 4844226880     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.006     Document Type: Article

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