Political pressure on the Bundesbank: An empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach

Journal of Macroeconomics

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 103-123

  Maier, Philipp ^a   Sturm, Jan Egbert ^a   De Haan, Jakob ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bundesbank; Monetary policy; Political pressure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035997761     PISSN: 01640704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0164-0704(02)00008-3     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. The relationship between government deficits, money growth and inflation
2. Fitting autoregressive models for prediction
3. Statistical predictor identification
4. Gutes geld und schlechte politik
5. The Bundesbank's reaction to policy conflicts
6. The economics of VAR models
7. Distribution of the estimates for autoregressive time series with a unit root
8. Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive time series with a unit root
9. Cointegration and unit roots
10. The political economy of central-bank independence
11. The asymmetric effects of political pressures on US monetary policy
12. Comparing alternative tests of causality in temporal systems. Analytic results and experimental evidence
13. Autoregressive modeling and money-income causality detection
14. Exchange rate-price causality in the recent floating period
15. How independent is the Bundesbank really? A survey
16. Who supported the Deutsche Bundesbank? An empirical investigation
17. The political business cycle
18. The great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis
19. Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles
20. Output effects of infrastructure investment in the Netherlands
21. Lag-length selection and tests of granger causality between money and income