Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Ecological Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 11, 2011, Pages 2083-2097

  D'Adda, Giovanna ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Artefactual experiment; Bolivia; Latin America; Motivation crowding; Social norms

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; FIELD METHOD; HETEROGENEITY; LABORATORY METHOD; NATURAL RESOURCE; RESOURCE USE; TRADE-OFF;

BOLIVIA;

EID: 80052037196     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.06.006     Document Type: Article

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