Rent seeking and corruption in financial markets

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 3, Issue , 2011, Pages 579-600

  Khwaja, Asim Ijaz ^a   Mian, Atif ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency issues; Financial market design and regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051761120     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080310     Document Type: Review

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