Information and incentives inside the firm: Evidence from loan officer rotation

Journal of Finance

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 795-828

  Hertzberg, Andrew ^a   Liberti, Jose Maria ^b   Paravisini, Daniel ^a  

^a The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

^b DEPAUL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953672658     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01553.x     Document Type: Article

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