Corporate political contributions and stock returns

Journal of Finance

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 687-724

  Cooper, Michael J ^a   Gulen, Huseyin ^b   Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952563031     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01548.x     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Ansolabehere Stephen, de Figueiredo John M, Snyder James M. Why is there so little money in U.S. politics. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2003, 17:105-130.
2. Ansolabehere Stephen, Snyder James M. Money and institutional power. Texas Law Review 1999, 77:1673-1704.
3. Ansolabehere Stephen, Snyder James M, Ueda Michiko. Did firms profit from soft money. Election Law Journal 2004, 3:193-198.
4. Barberis Nicholas, Shleifer Andrei, Vishny Robert. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of Financial Economics 1998, 49:307-343.
5. Benmelech Efraim, Moskowitz Tobias. The political economy of financial regulation: Evidence from U.S. Senate usury laws in the 18th and 19th century. 2006, Working paper, University of Chicago
6. Bernard Victor L, Thomas Jacob K. Post-earnings announcement drift: Delayed price response or risk premium. Journal of Accounting Research 1989, 27:1-36.
7. Bertrand Marianne, Kramarz Francis, Schoar Antoinette, Thesmar David. Politically connected CEOs and corporate outcomes: Evidence from France. 2006, Working paper, University of Chicago Business School
8. Bombardini Matilde, Trebbi Francesco. Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy. 2008, Working paper, University of British Columbia
9. Brav Alon, Heaton John C. Competing theories of financial anomalies. Review of Financial Studies 2002, 15:575-606.
10. Cheung Yan-Leung, Jing Lihua, Rau P Raghavendra, Stouraitis Aris. How does the grabbing hand grab? Tunneling assets from Chinese listed companies to the state. 2006, Working paper, Purdue University
11. Daniel Kent, Grinblatt Mark, Titman Sheridan, Wermers Russ. Measuring mutual fund performance with characteristic-based benchmarks. Journal of Finance 1997, 52:1035-1058.
12. Daniel Kent, Hirshleifer David, Subrahmanyam Avanidhar. Investor psychology and investor security market under-and overreactions. Journal of Finance 1998, 53:1839-1886.
13. Davis James L, Fama Eugene F, French Kenneth R. Characteristics, covariances and average returns: 1929-1997. Journal of Finance 2000, 55:389-406.
14. Durden Garey C, Shorgen Jason F, Silberman Jonathan I. The effects of interest group pressure on coal strip-mining legislation. Social Science Quarterly 1991, 72:239-250.
15. Faccio Mara. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review 2006, 96:369-386.
16. Faccio Mara, Masulis Ronald W, McConnell John J. Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance 2006, 61:2597-2635.
17. Faccio Mara, Parsley David C. Sudden deaths: Taking stock of political connections. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2009, June 2009 33:683-718.
18. Fama Eugene F. Efficient capital markets II. Journal of Finance 1991, 46:1575-1617.
19. Fama Eugene F, French Kenneth R. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 1992, 47:427-465.
20. Fama Eugene F, French Kenneth R. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 1993, 33:3-56.
21. Fama Eugene F, French Kenneth R. Multifactor explanation of asset pricing anomalies. Journal of Finance 1996, 51:55-84.
22. Fisman David, Fisman Ray, Galef Julia, Khurana Rakesh. Estimating the value of connections to Vice President Cheney. 2006, Working paper, Columbia University
23. Fisman Raymond. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 2001, 91:1095-1102.
24. Goldman Eitan, Rocholl Jörg, So Jongil. Do politically connected boards affect firm value. Review of Financial Studies 2009, 22, 2331-2360
25. Grier Kevin B, Munger Michael C. Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and campaign contributions. Economic Inquiry 1991, 29:24-43.
26. Grier Kevin B, Munger Michael C, Roberts Brian E. The determinants of industry political activity, 1978-1986. American Political Science Review 1994, 88:911-926.
27. Grossman Gene M, Helpman Elhana. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 1994, 84:833-850.
28. Hart David M. Why do some firms give? Why do some give a lot?: High-tech PACs, 1977-1996. Journal of Politics 2001, 63:1230-1249.
29. Heckman James. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 1979, 47:153-161.
30. Hirsch Barry T, Macpherson David A. Union membership and coverage database from the Current Population Survey: Note. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 2003, 56:349-354.
31. Hong Harrison, Stein Jeremy. A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and overreaction in asset markets. Journal of Finance 1999, 54:2413-2184.
32. Jagannathan Ravi, Wang Zhenyu. The conditional CAPM and the cross-section of expected returns. Journal of Finance 1996, 51:3-53.
33. Jayachandran Seema. The Jeffords effect. Journal of Law and Economics 2006, 49:397-425.
34. Jegadeesh Narasimhan, Titman Sheridan. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance 1993, 48:65-91.
35. Jensen Michael, Meckling William. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 1976, 3:305-360.
36. Kaufmann D, Kraay A, Mastruzzi M. Governance matters III: Governance indicators for 1996-2002. 2003, Working paper, The World Bank
37. Kroszner Randall S, Stratmann Thomas. Interest-group competition and the organization of Congress: Theory and evidence from financial services' political action committees. American Economic Review 1998, 88:1163-1187.
38. Langbein Laura I, Lotwis Mark. The political efficacy of lobbying and money: Gun control in the U.S. House, 1986. Legislative Studies Quarterly 1990, 15:413-440.
39. Leuz Christian, Oberholzer-Gee Felix. Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics 2006, 81:411-439.
40. Margolis Joshua, Elfenbain Hillary, Walsh James. Does it pay to be good? A meta-analysis and redirection of research on the relationship between corporate social and financial performance. 2007, Working paper, University of Michigan
41. Masters Matrick F, Keim Gerald D. Determinants of PAC participation among large corporations. Journal of Politics 1985, 47:1158-1173.
42. Milyo Jeffrey, Primo David, Groseclose Timothy. Corporate PAC campaign contributions in perspective. Business and Politics 2000, 2:75-88.
43. Navarro Peter. Why do corporations give to charity. Journal of Business 1988, 61:65-93.
44. Petersen Mitchell. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Review of Financial Studies 2009, 22:435-480.
45. Petkova Ralitsa, Zhang Lu. Is value riskier than growth. Journal of Financial Economics 2005, 78:187-202.
46. Roberts Bryan E. A dead senator tells no lies: Seniority and the distribution of federal benefits. American Journal of Political Science 1990, 34:31-58.
47. Romer Thomas, Snyder James M. An empirical investigation of the dynamics of PAC contributions. American Journal of Political Science 1994, 38:745-769.
48. Snyder James M. Campaign contributions as investments: The House of Representatives, 1980-1986. Journal of Political Economy 1990, 98:1195-1227.
49. Snyder James M. Long-term investing in politicians, or give early, give often. Journal of Law and Economics 1992, 35:15-43.
50. Stigler George J. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 1971, 2:359-365.
51. Stratmann Thomas. What do campaign contributions buy? Deciphering causal effects of money and votes. Southern Economic Journal 1991, 57:606-664.
52. Stratmann Thomas. Campaign contributions and congressional voting: Does the timing of contributions matter. Review of Economics and Statistics 1995, 77:127-136.
53. Stratmann Thomas. The market for congressional votes: Is timing of contributions everything. Journal of Law and Economics 1998, 41:85-113.
54. Stratmann Thomas. Some talk: Money on politics. A (partial) review of the literature. Public Choice 2005, 124:135-156.
55. Titman S, Wei K, Xie F. Capital investments and stock returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2004, 39:677-700.
56. Tullock Gordon. The purchase of politicians. Western Economic Journal 1972, 10:345-355.
57. Tullock Gordon. Efficient rent-seeking. Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society 1980, Buchanan JMTollison GTullock G. in, eds, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX
58. Wang Jia, Coffey Betty. Board composition and corporate philanthropy. Journal of Business Ethics 1992, 11:771-778.
59. Zardkoohi Asghar. On the political participation of the firm in the electoral process. Southern Economic Journal 1985, 51:804-817.