Has the Erie doctrine been repealed by congress?

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

Volumn 156, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1629-1648

  Hazard Jr , Geoffrey C ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 54549111274     PISSN: 00419907     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (114)

1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C).
2. CAFA § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (Supp. V 2005).
3. 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
4. 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
5. 518 U.S. 415, 427-28, 431-32 (1996).
6. Id. at 427.
7. Cf. Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 872-82 (1995) (explaining the Erie tension in the context of mass tort reform).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 114 (1992) (hailing Justice Chase's acquittal as an important victory for judicial independence).
10. See generally id. at 114-34 (discussing the importance of Justice Chase's acquittal and concluding that it "has come to stand for the proposition that impeachment is not a proper weapon for Congress . . . to employ in these confrontations"). This strong tenure provision has become of additional significance now that state court judicial offices, under Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), are subject to constitutionally protected politicization. See, e.g., AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), at 1 (2008), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/ pdfs/DevelopmentsAfterWhite.pdf (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in White held that a provision preventing judicial candidates from expressing political views was unconstitutional).
11. But cf. John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53, 60-63 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999) (arguing that lawyers' self-interest may have helped in the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14. 304 U.S. at 74-75.
15. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
16. Erie, at 73-74.
17. 276 U.S. at 523-24.
18. Id. at 530-31.
19. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
20. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517-27 (1984).
21. Justice Brandeis said that "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law," Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, which is perhaps true in the strictest sense of "common law." But surely Congress now has, and I would think then had, the power to regulate the railroad-transportation relationships involved.
22. Id. at 74-75.
23. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) ("[T]he proper function of the . . . federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be").
24. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1939).
25. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).
26. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
27. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-05 (1956) (requiring that state law determine the enforceability of an arbitration clause); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (finding that Federal Rule 23 does not provide the exclusive form of control over class suits, but rather controls only the procedural aspects, leaving states free to impose additional substantive requirements); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1949) (enforcing a state rule that filing or service of summons constituted commencement of the suit under the statute of limitations, rather than the Federal Rules' definition of the commencement of the suit).
28. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
29. Id. at 537-39.
30. As so often is done in such cases, the Court disparaged the significance of the matter to the law of the state, in this instance South Carolina: The conclusion is inescapable that the [South Carolina rule] is grounded in the practical consideration that . . . the courts [of the state] had become accustomed to deciding the factual issue . . . without the aid of juries. . . . Thus the requirement appears to be merely a form and mode of enforcing the [state's rule involving the factual issue]. Id. at 536. To the contrary, the evolution of the South Carolina rule indicates that it reflected that State's concept of the separation of powers.
31. Guaranty, 326 U.S. at 109.
32. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-39.
33. Id. at 537 (footnote omitted).
34. Compare Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980) (holding that Rule 3 is not operative in diversity cases), with West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 38-39 (1987) (finding that Rule 3 controls in federal claim cases).
35. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965).
36. The Massachusetts statute said, in one sentence, "an executor . . . shall not be held to answer . . . unless . . . the writ . . . has been served by delivery in hand." Id. at 462 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958)). In Walker, however, the Oklahoma provisions were in separate statutory sections. 446 U.S. at 742-43.
37. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
38. Id. at 531-33.
39. Id. at 518-21. In Van Dusen, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964), the Court stated that a party should not be permitted "to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed." The term "result" is of course from the Erie Doctrine rather than the Erie decision.
40. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
41. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
42. Id. at 418.
43. Id. at 434-36, 438-39.
44. Id. at 419.
45. Id. at 420.
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONS., amend. VII.
48. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 451-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using a review of English common law to find a Seventh Amendment bar to appellate review of jury determinations).
49. See the extensive discussion in Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (H.L.), which is quoted in the dissent of Justice Hughes in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 409-415 (1913) (Hughes, J., dissenting).
50. 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943).
51. 28 F. Cas. 745, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (prefacing his determination of jury rights on an examination of English law).
52. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 501-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the jury provisions state by state before the adoption of the Constitution); see also Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391-92 (noting that "[i]n 1791 this process [of the continual evolution of jury trial rights] already had resulted in widely divergent common-law rules on procedural matters among the states, and between them and England$).
53. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
54. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 465 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 468.
56. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 465-67.
57. Id. at 451-58.
58. Id. at 439-40.
59. Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1011 (C.P.) (finding that while a jury can disagree with a judge on the proper verdict and still avoid any punishment, this may not be true if it returns a "false verdict" in, for example, a capital case).
60. See Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (H.L.) (granting a new trial due to jury irregularities such that the defendant, "in effect [had] not been tried").
61. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
62. The classic scholarly formulation of this statement is found in Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
63. Madison raised this concern at the Constitutional Convention when discussing the proper scope for federal court jurisdiction. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 8 (5th ed. 2003).
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
65. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. The present diversity jurisdiction grant is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. V 2005).
66. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 6, 17 Stat 196, 197; Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93. However, Congress prescribed a separate and procedurally uniform system for federal equity jurisdiction. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
67. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 125 n.25 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting that the Process Acts of 1792, 1793, and 1828 all required static conformity to state law in cases at law).
68. See id. ("In the Conformity Act of 1872, Congress amended the Process Acts by providing for dynamic conformity to the state law of remedies on the law side.").
69. Cf. Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 1001-02 (2005) (noting the impact of the Field Code in moving from "common law" to "code pleading," especially over the merger into a single form of action with simplified pleading).
70. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872).
71. See Gagliardi, 564 F.2d at 125 n.25 (emphasizing the distinction between law and equity procedure).
72. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (discussing the antecedent considerations leading to the passage of the Act).
73. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 581 (Deering 1931).
74. Id. § 629 (Deering 1923). The similarity between this provision and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) and (b) is evident. These provisions allow for a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict if "the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1), (b).
75. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
76. Supra notes 54-56.
77. 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
78. Id. at 368.
79. Id. at 369.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 375.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 375-76 (quoting 1905 Pa. Laws 286) ; see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 399.
87. Id. at 380.
88. Id. at 380.
89. Id. at 400 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 418-19.
91. Id. at 427-28.
92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2) (allowing relief from final judgment in the event of "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial").
93. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 380 (1913).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
95. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) (noting the similarities between the summary judgment standard and judgment as a matter of law's "reasonable jury" standard, and claiming that the appropriate inquiry is on "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury"); see also Celotex Inc. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (requiring that a party show sufficient evidence on each element for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial to avoid summary judgment under Rule 56(c)).
96. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment infringes on the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury).
97. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
98. Id. at 482-83.
99. Id. at 491 (Stone, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 491-92.
101. Id. at 492 n.2.
102. Id. at 495-96.
103. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996) (citing Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 164 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
104. See id. at 460-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing strenuously that such a practice constitutes a reexamination of facts found by a jury in violation of the Seventh Amendment).
105. 293 U.S. 474, 492 n.2 (1935).
106. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 139 (5th ed. 2001) (describing the process of "'protective jurisdiction,' whereby the federal courts would protect the parties from supposed unfairness or incompetence at the hands of state courts").
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
108. Id. § 1332(a)(1).
109. Id. § 1332(a)(2).
110. Id. § 1332(a)(4).
111. Id. § 1332(c).
112. Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 248 (1992).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000).
114. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion).