Completing contracts in the shadow of costly verification

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 503-534

  Choi, Albert ^a   Triantis, George ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52249113135     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/589665     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Bernardo, Antonio, Eric Talley, and Ivo Welch. 2000. A Theory of Legal Presumptions. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16:1-49.
2. Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
3. Che, Yeon-Koo, and Donald B. Hausch. 1999. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting. American Economic Review 89:125-47.
4. Calfee, John E., and Richard Craswell. 1984. Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards. Virginia Law Review 70:965-1003.
5. Craswell, Richard, and John E. Calfee. 1986. Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2:279-303.
6. Gale, Douglas, and Martin Hell wig. 1985. Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem. Review of Economic Studies 52:647-63.
7. Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Politcal Economy 94:691-719.
8. Hadfield, Gillian K. 1994. Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 23:159-84.
9. Hart, Oliver. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. New York: Clarendon Press.
10. Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica 56:755-86.
11. Hylton, Keith N. 1990a. Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:433-52.
12. _. 1990b. The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence. International Review of Law and Economics 10:161-71.
13. _. 2002. Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation under Strict Liability. American Law and Economics Review 4:18-44.
14. Kahan, Marcel. 1989. Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule. Journal of Legal Studies 18:427-47.
15. Kaplow, Louis. 1995. A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11:150-63.
16. Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. 1994. Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 37:1-15.
17. _. 1996. Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 39:191-210.
18. Khalil, Fahad. 1997. Auditing without Commitment. RAND Journal of Economics 28:629-40.
19. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
20. Nalebuff, Barry. 1987. Credible Pretrial Negotiation. RAND Journal of Economics 18:198-210.
21. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1988a. The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials. International Review of Law and Economics 8: 109-16.
22. _. 1988b. The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability. Journal of Legal Studies 17:151-64.
23. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1989. Legal Error, Litigation and the Incentive to Obey the Law. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5:99-108.
24. Sanchirico, Chris. 2001. Relying on the Information of Interested-and Potentially Dishonest-Parties. American Law and Economics Review 3:320-57.
25. Sanchirico, Chris, and George Triantis. 2008. Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24:72-94.
26. Schwartz, Alan, and Joel Watson. 2004. The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20:2-31.
27. Scott, Robert E., and George G. Triantis. 2006. Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design. Yale Law Journal 114:815-79.
28. Shavell, Steven. 1987. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
29. Spier, Kathryn E. 1994. Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10:84-95.
30. Townsend, Robert M. 1979. Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification. Journal of Economic Theory 21:265-93.