Evidentiary arbitrage: The fabrication of evidence and the verifiability of contract performance

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 72-94

  Sanchirico, Chris William ^a   Triantis, George ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47749135976     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm042     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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