Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders

EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 237-242

  Ledyard, John O ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Combinatoric; Core; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COST EFFECTIVENESS; SET THEORY; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

AUCTIONS; MECHANISM DESIGNS; SINGLE-MINDED BIDDERS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 36448970093     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250945     Document Type: Conference Paper

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