Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Proceedings - The 9th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology; The 4th IEEE International Conference on Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services, CEC/EEE 2007

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 21-28

  Gautam, Raghav Kumar ^a   Hemachandra, N ^b   Narahari, Y ^a   Prakash, Hastagiri ^a  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

^b INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY BOMBAY   (India)

Author keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC); Incentive compatibility (IC); Individual rationality (IR); Multi unit procurement; Optimal mechanism

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MECHANISMS; MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; TECHNOLOGY;

BAYESIAN; BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY (BIC); BUILDING BLOCKS; E-COMMERCE; E-SERVICES; ENTERPRISE COMPUTING; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY (IC); INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY (IR); INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES; MULTI-UNIT; MULTI-UNIT PROCUREMENT; OPTIMAL AUCTIONS; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; PROCUREMENT MECHANISMS; UNIT PRICES;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 39549089829     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.76     Document Type: Conference Paper

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