Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-6

  Hummel, Patrick ^a  

^a YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 79960016304     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.003     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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