Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 219-236

  Meirowitz, Adam ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036002551     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s355-002-8334-5     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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