Convergence results for unanimous voting

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 105, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 278-297

  Martinelli, César ^a  

^a INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036686134     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2848     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Information transmission in debate
2. Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem
3. Minority voting rights can maximize majority welfare
4. A Bayesian model of voting in juries
5. Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information
6. Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts
7. Conflicts and common interests in committees
8. Informative voting and Condorcet jury theorems with convex signal spaces
9. A convergence theorem for competitive bidding with differential information
10. Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding
11. Consensus and the accuracy of signals: Optimal committee design with endogenous information
12. The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions
13. A bidding model of perfect competition
14. Condorcet's theory of voting