The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis

The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-304

  Henderson, David K ^a   Horgan, Terence ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

A priori; Coherentism; Contextualism; Epistemic externalism; Epistemic internalism; Epistemology; Foundationalism; Iceberg epistemology; Justification; Low grade a priori; Morphological content; Naturalized epistemology; Reliabilism; Transglobal reliabilism

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957089369     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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