It takes all types: Social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds

International Theory

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 345-380

  Rathbun, Brian C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

cooperation; foreign policy; international relations theory; social psychology; trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956246827     PISSN: 17529719     EISSN: 17529727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1752971909990121     Document Type: Article

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