Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community

International Organization

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 99-134

  Pollack, Mark A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031504236     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081897550311     Document Type: Article

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