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Volumn 15, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1215-1223

The changing structure of US corporate boards: 1997-2003

Author keywords

Board of directors; Board size; Board structure; Director independence

Indexed keywords


EID: 37149016433     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00642.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (47)

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    • Vidhi Chhaochharia is an Assistant Professor of Finance at University of Miami Business School. Her research interests include corporate finance and corporate governance. Prior to joining Miami University, she worked at the World Bank. Her study on the impact of the Sarbanes Oxley act on firm value has appeared in the Journal of Finance. Yaniv Grinstein is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Johnson School of Management, Cornell University. His research interests include corporate finance and corporate governance. He has published in a variety of refereed journals including the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Financial Intermediation, and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
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