Are interlocked directors effective monitors?

Financial Management

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 861-887

  Devos, Erik ^a   Prevost, Andrew ^b   Puthenpurackal, John ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO   (United States)

^b OHIO UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 73649125326     PISSN: 00463892     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2009.01059.x     Document Type: Article

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