The difficulty of the Linda conjunction problem can be attributed to its simultaneous concrete and unnatural representation, and not to conversational implicature

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-20

  Donovan, Sean ^a   Epstein, Seymour ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030615338     PISSN: 00221031     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jesp.1996.1309     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment and uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73.
2. Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between experiential and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 819-829.
3. Dulany, D. E., & Hilton, D. J. (1991). Conversational implicature, conscious representation, and the conjunction fallacy. Social Cognition, 9, 85-110.
4. Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49, 709-724.
5. Epstein, S., Denes-Raj, V., & Pacini, R. (1995). The Linda problem revisited from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 1124-1138.
6. Epstein, S., & Donovan, S. (1995). [Is the Linda problem a true conjunction problem? Implications from frequency versus probability versions and individual differences in analytical style.] Unpublished data.
7. Epstein, S., & Pacini, R. (1995). [The Linda problem: A true conjunction problem, or does the conjunction rule not apply to multiple attributes in a single person?] Unpublished data.
8. Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking style. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 390-405.
9. Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50, 125-129.
10. Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond heuristics and biases. European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 83-115.
11. Gorman, M. E. (1986). How possibility affects falsification on a task that models scientific problem solving. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 85-96.
12. Gorman, M. E., & Gorman, M. E. (1984). A comparison of disconfirmatory, confirmatory, and a control strategy on Wason's 2, 4, 6 task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, A 36, 629-648.
13. Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds.), The logic of grammar. Encino: Dickenson.
14. Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Epstein, S. (1992). Cognitive-experiential self-theory and subjective probability: Further evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 534-544.
15. Lumney, G. H. (1970). Using analysis of variance with a dichotomous variable: An empirical study. Journal of Educational Measurement, 7, 263-269.
16. Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1996). Lessons on intuitive processing from the ratio-bias phenomenon: Principles of operation and interaction with rational reasoning. Manuscript submitted for publication.
17. Schwarz, N. (1994). Judgment in a social context: Biases, shortcomings, and the logic of conversation. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 123-162.
18. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
19. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
20. Yates, J. F., & Carlson, B. W. (1986). Conjunction errors: Evidence for multiple judgment procedures, including "signed summation." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 230-253.