Extortion in the laboratory

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 78, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 207-218

  Bolle, Friedel ^a   Breitmoser, Yves ^a   Schlächter, Steffen ^a  

^a EUV Frankfurt ^*  (Germany)

Author keywords

Extortion; Finitely repeated game; Laboratory experiment; Mafia; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955833650     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.005     Document Type: Article

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