Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 425-441

  Kübler, Dorothea ^a   Weizsäcker, Georg ^b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LABORATORY METHOD;

EID: 11144357762     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00290     Document Type: Article

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